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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

IRAQI PROJECTS IN YAR DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Jul 82 p 9

[Article by 'Adb al-Rahman 'Ali Munis: "Iraqi Projects in Service for Our Yemeni Brothers"]

[Text] When you meet a Yemeni on Yemeni soil, he gives you the facts that he considers elementary basic truths. He is the first to tell you that warm relations between Arab and Arab is a settled fact and that this tie must be strengthened even more despite the feelings of brotherhood and membership in this Arab Community.

We spoke first, sitting with a group of brothers. We said that the Iraqi feels a special kind of affection and closeness toward the Yemenis. This is what brings the Arabs together and unites them.

I should mention that one of the brothers, whose name I don't recall, said that President Saddam Husayn was a true friend. "We also say that the Iraqis have much that brings them close to our people here. That is due to the long-past years when colonialism ruled Iraq, and Yemen was burdened under the rule of the Imamate. Yemeni officers graduated in Iraq in the 30's and an Iraqi took part in the 1948 revolt against the Imam and played a prominent role. Yemenis, as they did in the first Qadisiyah, hurried to take up arms and oppose the Iranian aggression. That is the meaning of brotherhood."

He then went on to say: "We believe in what you do. You have built us schools and the medical center, and you have dug wells, because they are the basis of brotherly relations between us."

A few days after the conversation, we met with the Governor of Ta'iz. We asked him about the province's projects. He talked about the ones that Iraq had carried out, and he spoke with pride. We were proud of the general progress evident in the lives of our brothers in Yemen.

During our tour in Yemen, we visited the Iraqi Embassy and met with several brothers working on the Iraqi projects that are being implemented in Yemen. They expressed their delight that they are fulfilling a part of their service in this brotherly country, giving what duty dictates to its people, since Iraq is committed to undertaking what mutual Arab interests dictate in the sphere of offering services to brothers and helping them to carry out projects.

Devotion to Arabism

In a meeting with Mr Ghafil Jasim, the Iraqi ambassador in San'a, we agreed on the nature of the efforts that Iraq is making in this field, in harmony with the spirit of Arab friendship, which makes us feel that the Arab nations are one Arab home, with everyone responsible for its affairs.

The ambassador said: "Years ago, the revolution in Iraq, under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, saw a need to offer aid and assistance to Yemen, in the form of diverse projects that would be of benefit to the sons of our people in Yemen, stemming from the central feeling applied by the leadership of the party and the revolution in Iraq, led by our leader, President Saddam Husayn: Iraq's wealth is for the Iraqis and the Arabs. The president and the leadership of the party and the revolution are anxious to invest a large part of Iraq's wealth in those Arab countries that suffer from a paucity of resources, with Yemen in their forefront.

"The projects being carried out by Iraq in Yemen cannot be mentioned in isolation. The Yemeni has taken his blood and weapon and has gone to defend Iraq. He is fighting with his people to maintain Arab honor, and Yemen's strong stance will continue to be testimony to and evidence of the depth of its pan-Arab feelings. The souls of our ancestors continue to live on in us, with their noble qualities. This is devotion to Arabism and is the basis of brotherhood. It is a position which none of our people in Yemen consider strange or excessive.

"The stance of President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih and his declaration of support for Iraq against the Iranian invasion, and the empty threats of Tehran's rulers, is a warning to those traitorous rulers who were content to stand with foreigners." The ambassador went on to say: "When we talk about Yemen's courageous sacrifices, we should mention the firm relations that exist between the two Arab presidents, Saddam Husayn and his brother, 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih, and the continuous contacts between them, through direct meetings, envoys, and messages exchanged for consultation on all matters of interest to the Arab Nation. This is a reflection of Iraq's relationship with Yemen, whether in the one Arab Nation framework or in the realm of the good offices that the two countries expend for our community and their compliance with the call of destiny. "Thus, Iraq has shared and will share in bringing progress to Yemen in various ways, since there is a work team to implement projects and a team to dig artesian wells. Several roads and schools have been built, and health services centers have been established in accordance with pan-Arab duty."

Stories Regarding This Center

After all this, I had to visit one of the projects. We chose the Iraqi health center in San'a, which has been opened in one of the people's area just like one of the areas in Baghdad, except that it is made of stone. Upon entering or leaving it, one only sees signs of happiness on the faces, which suggests that the Yemeni does not allow pain to show on his features, but rather, is patient and tolerant.

At the outset, I met brother Abi Ahmad, one of the workers in the center, who told us this story:

"A few days ago, my wife entered the hospital. When our Yemeni brothers and friends heard about this, they rushed to visit her and showed such sympathy that it affected us greatly."

It seems that some of them brought their wives and children, while others declared their willingness to donate blood.

"Others carried quantities of cash, fearing that I might need it. I was embarrassed. Isn't that a sign of their friendship?"

Moreover, it is their custom to visit the sick every day and to take care of matters at home until the sick one has recovered. In the health center, there are several specialties for children, as well as internal medicine and dental care. Those who work there carry out their duties and greet their brothers with pleasure and love. Above all they want to cure them with the proper diagnosis and treatment.

Dr 'Abd al-Rasul 'Abd al-Majid, the center's director, says: "We put no restriction on our working hours. As for medicine, it is dispensed in sufficient amounts, and all of it is locked up. The patients have confidence in us and are grateful." With Dr 'Ali Mahmud, a pediatrician, I met several people who had brought their children in for treatment.

Mrs Hazhiyah Muhammad al-Musajidi said: "I have seven children. Illness has forced us to bring them here one after the other. The brothers in the center have cared for them and have given them medicine to cure them. The service is great, and we thank Iraq for this work."

Mr Muhammad Ahmad al-Kabsa said: "I have come here several times for treatment. The care is excellent, and everything is free."

Diyafullah 'Amir said: "This is one of the benefits for me and my children, since everything is available and free. Here, we also feel pleased and reassured."

Dr 'Ali said: "There are many patients, and that pleases us because it is proof of the confidence in our doctors, our cadres and our work. Moreover, it means that our brothers are benefiting from this health facility, which has basically been opened to serve them."

With Dr Fu'ad Ibrahim, the dentist, we found several brothers who were having dental work. Dr Fu'ad said: "Yemenis are friendly, and when one of them complains about being sick, he rushes to us. We have become friends or acquaintances with many of them."

For Us and For Our Families

'Abdu Ibn 'Abud said: "When I enter the center, I feel happy. The brothers here offer excellent and free services."

Mr Muhammad Salih Sadiq said: "The Iraqi's are indeed brothers, and we thank them for this outstanding work which benefits us and our families."

Dr Ibtisam 'Abd al-Razzaq, who is a gynecologist, has become used to asking her patients, "Where does it hurt?" She said: "The work is wonderful here, because I am providing service to those who need it, and they in turn show their friendship and respect for us. We will not forget their honorable Arab position regarding our just battle against the Iranian enemy."

As for Miss Saham Zaydan, a nurse in the center, she described some of the cases by saying: "Sometimes, some of them consult me at home asking for treatment. I find happiness in that. This proves their trust, and for my part, I feel that that makes me work even harder."

The laboratory analyst, 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-Hafiz, said: "We work hard as possible to accomplish the treatment, without putting it off to another day. We find it difficult to inconvenience the patient by telling him to come back another day. This is a part of our duty."

The pharmacist, Faysal Salih, said: "When we dispense medicine to the patient we are very careful to explain to him the proper dosage, because we want him to be cured. He is one of our community's assets, and our only reason for being is to keep him from being ill."

Among the patients for that day was First Lieutenant Husayn Ahmad Salim and his family. He said: "All of the family is with me, because the children and their mother need treatment. This is the fourth time that I have come to the center. I come whenever I feel the need for it."

"I would like to say that what many people say is true. The Iraqi health center offers us its excellent services, which is partial reflection of Iraq's brotherly positions."

He added that he wished to send greetings to all the brothers in Iraq and Yemen. "We pray God that He protect the two presidents, Saddam Husayn and 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih, in the service of the Arab Nation."

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AFGHANISTAN

REGIME SOLDIERS SEEN DOING POORLY TO DEFEND KABUL

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German No 191, 20 Aug 82 p 5

[Report by A.H., Nicosia correspondent: "Struggle of Afghan Resistance Movement"]

[Text] Nicosia, 13 August--The latest reports that have reached the outside world from Kabul and which stem from diplomatic sources reveal that during the night before 27 July heavy fighting took place in the Afghan capital. It appears that the people of the resistance movement wanted to attack a munitions depot in the city section of Shashehid. Artillery and rockets were used, at least 12 government soldiers were said to have been killed. Three government posts were overrun. Diplomats who were following the fighting from the rooftops supposedly saw that Afghan government troops were fighting only negligently, and at least once, instead of shooting at the partisans, they had taken aim at the Russians who were participating in the fighting. Furthermore, they had taken their machinegun magazines filled with ammunition, dropped them to the ground and left them there, apparently with the intention of letting the partisans get hold of them.

A Series of Attacks in the Capital

According to the same sources in Kabul, the fighting during the night before 27 July--which had spread to almost every district--was the climax to several prior attacks. During one of the preceding attacks a housing block had been surrounded by the partisans and an Afghan colonel had been abducted.

The fighting in Kabul is coinciding with an increased pressure on recruitment. The authorities lowered the recruiting age from 21 to 19 and all reservists up to the age of 35 who had already completed their service were recalled for an additional 2 years. The report continued that soldiers who are currently serving, must remain on active duty for 3 years instead of 2, as has been the case to date. Recruiting officers are trying to catch hold of all young people, and many men hide to avoid conscription. Entire sections in Kabul seem deserted because men avoid being seen on the streets.

The Russian Summer Offensives

The actions in Kabul show that the Russians and the government army did not succeed in totally shattering the resistance movement which had settled in

the mountains surrounding the capital, although in April the government had announced a "plan to crush the counterrevolution" and subsequently two major offensives were undertaken with the help of Soviet arms and, in part, air raids that were launched from Soviet airports, in an apparent attempt to drive back the partisans from the mountains in the immediate vicinity of Kabul. One of the offensives was directed at the little town of Pagham, 24 kilometers west of the capital--the former summer residence of Afghan kings--where the resistance fighters had been in control during the winter months. The town was apparently occupied, but the garrisons that were stationed in the town by the government are frequently attacked at nighttime from the mountains.

The Epic of the Panjir Valley

There are more details available about the attack by 20,000 Soviet and Afghan troops on the Panjir Valley, because Western journalists and doctors were there at the time of the attack. In spite of four previous offensives, the Panjir Valley had always remained in the hands of the resistance fighters. Massoud, the 35-year-old commander of the region and a military and political leader who is well-known all over Afghanistan, had organized the armed resistance. In the Panjir Valley there were schools and clinics that were managed by the partisans; it is said that there were even libraries. Guerrilla fighters from the neighboring valleys had moved to the Panjir Valley to be trained, and occasionally the valley granted refuge to the inhabitants of nearby valleys when their villages were under attack. Previous attacks by government troops had been halted by the resistance fighters at the entry of the valley or a little higher in the valley.

Massoud's partisans used to undertake actions against the major route that connects Kabul with the Soviet Union over the Salang Pass. On 2 May, before the major attack on the valley, they had blown up a munitions depot in Kabul and shortly before that they had attacked the military airport of Bagram, north of Kabul, in a joint action with other resistance fighters, during the process of which they claimed to have destroyed 23 planes.

Helicopter Attack

The Russian-Afghan attack began on 17 May. Massoud was said to have expected it, because he receives information regularly from army offices in Kabul. It was a surprise, however, that this time--following several heavy bombardments--the attacking troops landed in helicopters and were able to reach and occupy the villages at the bottom of the valley much faster than during earlier attacks. The tanks from Kabul arrived later, on 20 May. Massoud was said to have prepared hideouts for the villagers in the mountains and many of the villagers were able to get there. The partisans also retreated to the mountains and tried to shoot down helicopters from there and bombarded Soviet camps. Massoud's partisans have antitank weapons with which they can destroy tanks and under favorable conditions, perhaps from mountain sides, they can also destroy helicopters.

While attempting to pursue the partisans with helicopters in the narrow side valleys, the attackers are said to have suffered heavy losses. But Soviet and government troops were able to occupy the valley, which meant that the peasants could no longer irrigate their crops and they dried up.

Partial Evacuation by Government

The government, which at the beginning spoke of a decisive victory, later had to admit that its troops had evacuated the upper parts of the valley. The partial retreat is to have taken place 20 days after the attack. Garrisons were stationed in the lower villages; attempts were made to bring new settlers into the valley. But according to the latest reports the garrisons are isolated at the bottom of the valley, and the soldiers do not dare leave their fortified camps unless they are in armored vehicles; some of their supplies have to be brought by helicopters. Most of the party volunteers who had moved into the captured villages are already dead. The valley is said to have 100,000 inhabitants; apparently most of them found refuge with the partisans in the mountains and in neighboring valleys. The partisans claim that the casualties among government troops number 3,000 dead and wounded. Their own losses, which has been confirmed by foreign observers, are to be low; most of the losses among the population occurred before the evacuation and was due to the bombardments of villages. In the mountains the partisans are almost invulnerable in spite of heavy bombardments and shellings. Supplies and the economic situation of the valley give cause for greater concern. But some of the supplies had been buried and hidden, and the population of the neighboring hills and valleys had brought food to the evacuated Panjiris. The morale of the Panjiris, Massoud wrote in a letter that reached Peshawar, continues to be high. They are not yet tired of the war and it is not to be expected that they--as did 2.5 million of their Afghan fellow-citizens--will leave their valley and flee into the Pakistani exile.

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MUJAHEDIN MEANS OF SURVIVAL IN HAZARAJAT DESCRIBED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German No 186, 14 Aug 82 pp 29, 30

[Report by Eugen Rieser: "On Guerrilla Paths in Hazarajat"]

[Excerpts] At dawn--between rugged mountain ridges--a green paradise is opening up before our eyes. Through the trees one can see houses, stately farms: Anguri--the first village of the Jaghori region, the gate to Hazarajat. We stop in front of a large farmhouse outside the village. The Mujahedin appear nervous. The weapons are hastily transferred into a waiting vehicle. It is barely out of range, when armed men appear: Mujahedin from Anguri who want to know whether we are carrying any weapons.

The 23-year-old Kalam Saki Wocek is the commander of 400 Mujahedin. He attended Koran schools in Iran and Afghanistan and is a member of the organization Islamic Resistance Afghanistan (Nohsate Islami Afghanistan), a political force which is flirting with the ideas of the old imam Khomeyni. "If we had more leaders like the great Ayatollah, the world would be in order. Islam is playing the most important role in our struggle against the Schurevi--the Soviets. Allah-o-akhbar (Allah is great). But unfortunately we do not have any weapons against tanks and airplanes." The dilemma of the Afghan resistance movement is revealed in the bitter words of the young commander. The Mujahedin are powerless against Soviet tanks and the new armored combat helicopters.

Sang Masha--the main town of the Jaghori region, hundreds of widely scattered, oasis-like fortified farms; in the center there are two long rows of houses, the bazaar. The city is located in a wild, infertile basin of a valley, surrounded by high mountains that are covered with snow even in the summer. The southernmost region of Hazarajat has about 150,000 inhabitants. The Hazara people, ethnologically related to the Mongolian races, compose about one-tenth of the Afghan population--slightly more than 1 million people. Their language is the old Persian Dari or Farsi, although it is somewhat colored by dialect. The name of Hazara is derived from the Persian numeral "thousand," and it is assumed that it can be traced back to the 1,000-man units of the Mongolian conquerors of Genghis Khan. Most of the inhabitants of Hazarajat are Shiites, which means that within the multinational state of Afghanistan they are an Islamic minority.

At the edge of the city of Sang Masha we notice the ruins of a building that has been destroyed by gunfire. We are told that not long ago it was still housing the only hospital in the region. The hospital had been built by the French medical organization "Medicines sans frontieres" [Doctors Without Borders] and was managed by their people. Not only the hospital was leveled to the ground by bombs from Soviet MiG 21's but also the shops of the bazaar and the former middle school of Sang Masha were destroyed.

Three years ago, in May 1979, Sang Masha was the scene of a bloody liberation struggle. Kurban Methar, a 70-year-old, well-to-do peasant who at that time was one of the leaders of the insurgents remembers: "At the beginning we were 12 men with hunting rifles. But when the people of Jaghori saw that the struggle was not hopeless many joined us. The battle for Jaghori lasted 8 days and nights, subsequently our homeland was free." A division of the Kabul regime with tanks and vehicles was defeated, the soldiers were disarmed and sent away. Twenty soldiers did not survive the struggle of the Afghan brethren, while the Nazara lost six who died. Kurban Methar's family also had to bring a sacrifice for the liberation struggle: One of the sons died in the battle; he was struck by a tank grenade.

The liberation also produced new political difficulties. "Following the change of government in 1978, the mullahs and their partisans fled to Iran and they did not return until after the liberation, bringing weapons and money. But we had few weapons and little money; as a consequence it was easy for these religious leaders to be celebrated as the new rulers. But what are they doing? Nothing! They are sitting in their offices and taking all personal belongings from the people." That is the way Kurban Methar characterizes the new "government" of Sang Masha, which calls itself Revolutionary Council of the Unified Islam of Afghanistan (Schorai Enqelabe Etefaqe Islami Afghanistan). Sheikh Ali Uzak el-Islam, an imam and one of Afghanistan's highest Shiite clergymen, also has nothing good to say about his brethren-in-faith: "We are doing everything in our power to create unity and cooperation. The mullahs do not want it; they want cars, motorcycles, and dollars." When asked whether the split between Shiite and Sunni Moslems was also hindering the unification process, Sheikh Ali Uzak diplomatically replied: "Islam is like a tree. The roots are the same for all of us Moslems, only the branches are different. We have good relations with the Sunni Pathans. Our enemies are the godless, the Soviet Union and the communists."

According to the still youthful imam, Afghanistan's future is not very rosy. The struggle against the Soviet occupation will last for a long time, Shiekh Ali Uzak el-Islam says; he studied at the most important universities of the Arab world. "Following the liberation, a national independent government will have to be elected by the people. And this government should guarantee all democratic rights." Because of such ideas, this religious leader is certainly different from the fanatic, fundamentalist Moslem parties. The forces apparently want to establish a "state of Allah," with room only for Islam and the Koran words of Mohammed.

Assad, our companion, tells us casually that many of the tanks and jeeps that are loaded with goods of all kinds have Kabul license plates. Where do the goods come from? "Naturally, they are also from Kabul," a bazaar dealer says. A representative of the leftist-oriented resistance paper SADA-E-HAZARAJAT (Voice of the Hazarajat) gives us an explanation for this unusual trade arrangement. "The Soviets want to try a policy of appeasement in Hazarajat, which is a reason why Jaghori was only bombed twice. As a rule the Russians are not at all finicky. Right now they want to destroy the freedom myth in the Panjir Valley by dropping bombs; in Hazarajat, however, the policy is to pass out the candy."

Nevertheless, there may also be economic reasons why the Babrak Karmal regime is forced to tolerate the trade with the enemy. The prices charged by dealers who send their grandfathers to Kaubl to buy the goods--because they are too old to be drafted into the military--have doubled since the 1978 communist uprising due to limited supplies in that region. A kilogram of tea costs 180 afghans (approximately 2.80 Swiss francs), 7 kilograms of rice cost 150 afghans, one cake of soap is 14 afghans, 1 silver bracelet comes to 600 afghans. The monthly average income in Afghanistan, however, should be at the most 1,000 afghans.

While many peasants are complaining about their meager existence, some dealers and businessmen are apparently not doing badly at all. One bazaar merchant who has a medium-size shop in Sang Masha, thinks that he is selling even more than he did at the time of the Daud government. "Sang Masha is big and the capital of Jaghori; people are coming a long way to see us," is his explanation for the brisk business. Every day he sells goods valued at 6,000 afghans.

Our appearance at the bazaar of Damarda causes a great deal of surprise: We are surrounded by men who are asking questions. One of them talks with excitement about Soviet bombardments, while another one is dragging in the steel jacket of an unexploded bomb weighing approximately 150 kilograms. "Last year eight houses were destroyed when two Mig 21's bombarded our village. Nobody was hurt, but all the animals were killed," an older bazaar merchant says. Hadschi Mohammed Ajub Sawar Damarda Gulsar, former village chief and current chairman of the governing committee in the liberated Damarda--a 50-year-old portly man--is delighted with our visit, because no foreigners have visited his village to date, he says. The communist take-over in Damarda occurred 4 years ago and this is the way it happened: "A few soldiers came to me and took the official seal--the stamp--from me. A teacher who had taught at the village school, apparently a sympathizer of the Democratic People's Party of Afghanistan (DPPA), took over my post. To be sure, he was isolated in our village of 2,500 inhabitants; but the people were afraid to fight him or even remove him from office, because nobody knew when the soldiers of the Kabul regime would reappear. Later, when the soldiers were driven out of Sang Masha by the Mujahedin, our teacher also fled and was never seen again."

The committee of Damarda formed a combat unit of Mujahedin for the protection of the population. The guards are stationed a few kilometers from the city

on a mountain summit near the Kabul-Kandahar road. The weapons of these fighters are mostly old British carbines; only commanders occasionally have machineguns--of the Lakishnikow type--slung over their shoulders. Relatively rare are antitank grenades.

In addition to the inadequate firepower tanks and airplanes, the Afghan resistance movement also has to contend with logistic problems due to the already mentioned tribal feuds. "Most of the Mujahedin attacks are spontaneous raids. To date the fighters have not been able to wage a more effective battle, in part, because of a shortage of weapons but also because they lack a common supreme command. For the future a coordinated partisan war would be necessary to be able to increase the military initiative." At least, that is the assessment of a representative of the leftwing anti-Soviet Front of the Fighting Mujahed, an organization which formed an alliance with Islamic forces and which created quite a stir in 1979 with the spectacular attack on the Bala Hissar fortress in Kabul. "The Russians can only control large cities, which means that the biggest part of our country has been liberated. It does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union is strategically on the defensive. The Russians are offensive. But their main problem is the fact that they cannot hold conquered territories that extend over large areas. Consequently, because they do not have enough soldiers, the Soviets and the Kabul regime are concentrating on the strategically important axis of Qandahar-Kabul-Jalalabad." This theses was explained to us by Goljan Ferahie, an experienced commander from the southwestern part of Afghanistan (Schurai Islami Melete Afghanistan). "Our struggle for liberation will continue for a long time, because at the current military-technical level we can hardly win against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, something that would strengthen our military power would be a good dosis of military support from Western countries."

Egypt is practically the only country that sends weapons, and presumably the People's Republic of China also sends arms. One Mujahed whom we encountered patrolling Hazarajat comments with a suggestive smile: "The Schurevis themselves--the Soviets--are our biggest arms supplier."

Arms shipments from abroad are still very selective and consider only certain parties and consequently do not help reducing the contradictions and rivalries among Afghanistan's tribes. It is not a good omen for an easy unity and thus a common military supreme command. Nevertheless, Goljan Ferahie, Kurban Methar and Sheikh Al Uruk el-Islam, the leaders of the Afghan resistance movement in the interior of the country feel positive about the efforts concerning cooperation between dozens of fighting groups. Goljan Ferahie thinks: "We will be able to create a unified front in Afghanistan if we succeed in eliminating the differences between the resistance groups and tribes. Today there are three political forces that are fighting against the Soviets. The fanatic Islamic parties (fundamentalists), the Islamic nationals (democrats) and the leftwing Marxist organizations. But neither the fanatic moslems nor the Marxists have a chance. Rather, the democratic-Islamic forces will be the ones to assert themselves as a majority." In the opinion of observers it is more than doubtful that these hopes of the general secretary of the council, a former college instructor, will be fulfilled.

The consciousness of most of the Mujahedin does not go beyond the formula "Islam is good, the Soviets are evil." Nevertheless, it should provide a new impetus to dogmatic fundamentalists in a country which is experiencing an increasing Islamization anyway. "The example of the old imam in the neighboring country of Iran could also find followers in Afghanistan," a democratically inclined Moslem, a teacher, stated.

The dualist teachings of Zarathustra, the prophet and "lost son" who at one time was driven from the Hindu Kush, has apparently been revived in a new form. Good and evil, personified in Ahura Mazda, the wise lord, and Angra Mainyu, the prince of darkness, were to have stimulated the thinking of the nomadic people of Asia and drive back the multitude of old gods. But the prophet who--like Mohammed--was not loved in his own country had to leave. Today good stands for Islam and freedom, evil stands for Soviet Union and War.

On our return trip to Pakistan, we pass the Kabul-Kandahar road for the second time. It is night. We notice the hectic activities of the Mujahedin who are apparently preparing for a big coup. The next morning we know why so many fighters were roaming through the area. A Soviet reinforcement caravan with dozens of vehicles and tanks arrived. Near Mokuur we see burning vehicles and tanks. Gunfire reaches our ears. Black clouds of smoke remain visible at the horizon for a long time, a sign of partisan attacks on the occupiers.

In the western part of Pakistan, the resistance movement could deal a few severe blows to Soviet invaders during the last few months. In January, for instance, a group of Mujahedin succeeded in temporarily stopping a Russian convoy and blowing up vehicles carrying ammunition and dynamite. In the province of Hadhis the fighters even dared a bold action on Soviet territory; they attacked a kilkhooz and captured 700 sheep. In Herat, however, a mass uprising planned by the resistance movement failed because of betrayal. Soviet planes bombarded the city indiscriminately; the death toll came to 120 Mujahedin and hundreds of civilian victims.

But in spite of all reverses, the champions of Allah are far from giving up the fight. A Mujahed prophecy: "The struggle for liberation will last for a long time, but we will defeat the godless; Enshallah--if it is the will of Allah."

9881
CSO: 4620/58

EXPATRIATES STATUS ANALYZED

Algiers EL MCUDJAHID in French 8, 9, 10 Aug 82

[Articles by Djamel Benzaghrou: "Expatriate Youth: A Third Culture"]

[8 Aug 82 p 3]

[Text] In France, the lot of foreign workers in general, and Algerians in particular, is still characterized by a steady deterioration of their social and professional status and by an intensification of controls. According to an Algerian student preparing a state doctorate thesis in Paris, our compatriots are almost the only ones to be hemmed in by petty and coercive regulations by an administration which has been given exorbitant powers against them. Why and how did they get there? Too often, we forget that our emigration to France is the direct result of colonization.

The destruction and dismemberment of our society as well as the fellahs' dispossession from their lands during over 130 years progressively reduced them to destitution and a proletarian level--as an additional labor force during World War II [as published]. From 1914 to 1981, the expatriates then became a replacement labor force in the unhealthy sectors abandoned by French workers.

In 1916, a decree of the French government created a department of colonial workers at the Ministry of War, which was in charge of recruiting native workers in Indochina and in North Africa.¹ After that, the French state was to become the recruiter, importer, employment agent and controller of North African workers.

I.- The Other Side of the Veil

To all the problems resulting from the situation of the thousands and thousands of "pariahs of modern times" should be added--in spite of the decision made by our government in November 1973 to discontinue departures for Europe, first because the dignity and safety of our compatriots in France were no longer ensured and, second, because of a desire not to aggravate the grievous problem of our expatriates' reintegration into our society--the problems of language, housing,

health, jobs, nationality, military service for the second-generation youths (for whom some have coined the symbolic phrase: "zero generation"). The children of yesterday's expatriates, they are now entering the job market and becoming favorite targets for racism and unemployment.

The presence of these youths born, often in France, of a self-renewing pool of expatriates, is viewed by a large part of public opinion as a necessary evil which should be gotten rid of as soon as possible.

"We can no longer," certain youths we met during our investigation said, "make do with little, live in insalubrious houses, remain kneeling and silent until we are deported for any reason whatsoever or until we are old enough to retire and go back home."

"Our and our parents' crime is only that we dared demand for us a more just position, which should be ours in a society to the development and prosperity of which our parents have contributed their sweat and their blood."

Equal But Different

In this strange and unfamiliar world, as European sociologists themselves define the host country, today's expatriate worker, his daughter or son no longer manages to take stock concretely of their feeling of confusion, of "bad life," of the "taste of ashes in their mouths" secreted by the ignorance and contempt which they must face, by the arrogance and often the violence of the host country.

Does not the permanent heartbreak of the parents have a direct effect on their children's behavior? A few years ago, during a debate on a bill regulating the admission and stay of foreigners in France, a French deputy brilliantly summarized this situation when he wrote: "Ten years ago, before economic growth became sober, employers said: 'Mohamed, get your suitcase'; Mohamed came. He experienced the harshest exploitation. He saw his brothers falling from scaffolds or under the bullets of small groups which were never found nor bothered by the police, he saw them die away from their native land, their lungs eaten away by silicosis. He lived with his people in crowded shanty towns, in furnished hotel rooms. Away from his family, he knew the worst solitude..."

"Today, when the police come to deport him, does Mohamed still have time to pack his suitcase, to gather his possessions?"²

Born in France, the young Algerian expatriates express and reflect their parents' difficulties; in spite of themselves, they act like the developer in a solution of bitterness and suffering. They want to be equal, but different from French youths of the same age, and revolt against their fate. Naive and credulous, they have the ideals of their age and live on the fine words of 1789, Revolution, Equality, Fraternity.

"We are stuck somewhere between two worlds, and alone with ourselves," some of them say, disappointed.

Among second-generation youths, an Algerian sociologists states, the contradictory effects of the clash of two cultures are exacerbated and, he adds, instead of covering up realities, we must dare look today on the other side of the veil to see how these contradictions create tragedies for individuals and families, which are lived in a climate of heartbreak, exhaustion and despair.

Parents no longer manage to communicate with their children, he goes on, and some of them live in fear of seeing the family unit break up. Left to themselves in the middle of the ford, tossed between two different milieus, our youths are searching for an identity and pondering, and often find no convincing answer to their anxiety.

This situation is summarized by sociologist T. Benjelloun in his foreword to the book "La Mal Vie" [The Bad Life] dealing with the life of expatriate workers:

"Everywhere, an anguish on which a veil has been placed, as if to hide and cover the call of these second-generation expatriates, trapped as their parents were and sharing the same slow and heavy heartbreak which is gaining ground and will bring violent death, violent death on the construction site, early death in the street, death through wear and tear, disgust, penury..."

Although the efforts of Algerian organizations in favor of these youths are giving convincing results, the parents and families must assume their responsibilities, representatives of the Association say, and they should not rely on the Association since it cannot do everything and be everywhere to settle things. Only by joining efforts, they add, can we guarantee the success of our undertaking. This is the price to pay for the future of second-generation expatriates.

[9 Aug 82 p 3]

[Text] II.- The Zero-Generation or the Impossible Dialogue

Huge skyscrapers streaming with lights. Green areas everywhere. Supermarkets and large avenues congested with hundreds of cars with gleaming chrome trim. We could add a few more items to the list of stereotypes which a certain public opinion has of European countries, mythical and fabulous countries where the people are so rich and so nice... And where you can get rich easily and quickly.

These cliches anger and revolt M'Hamed Tsabet, a crane operator in a construction company near Paris. Perched on his machine more than 10 hours a day, to which 2 hours in public transports should be added, he knows that France is far from being that fabulous Eden.

In the evening, after his day's work, he has only one idea, to go back to his family in their two-room apartment--he has been living in France for 20 years--to get some rest and to forget...

For him, France is more like fog every day, 10 months out of 12, working 50 meters above the ground, the obsessive fear of the ladder he must climb 4 to 6 times a day, and the "sirocco" fit every week-end, when he has time to think about his life on a foreign land and about his future.

At 36, he realizes that his life is wasting away while his hopes for a triumphal return home are fading away.

The story of his life is identical to that of thousands of our compatriots who have crossed the sea, often under constraint, to contribute to the economic development of this country which, since then, has tried various stratagems to send them back. "We are disposable gadgets," some workers we met said.

It is also the tragic story of their children, the second-generation expatriates, whom some call the zero-generation.

These youths feel that they are neither helped nor loved in their host country. Nor, to believe in their value [as published] of non-value which prevents their full development and induces in some of them an inferiority complex followed by revolt.

The problems they have to live with and to face are numerous, acute and complex. All those we met launched themselves in a violent indictment of the host country and the native society.

However, in spite of all their efforts to "assimilate," these youths feel rejected. You should see, an educator explained, the moving efforts some of these youths make to integrate into the society which seems closer to them--that in which they live--and which rejects them harshly at every opportunity, in the high school, in the street, in the subway, in other words in every action of their daily lives, by reminding them that they are foreigners and barely tolerated...

Thus, the cultural models in presence are in a state of perpetual confrontation, in the daily relations between parents and children, at school, at work, in marriages, and they may result in serious and permanent conflict which a young student summarized for us in two words: impossible dialogue.

No Miracle Cure for the Ills of Immigration

The tragedy of the second generation, a social worker told us, is that in fact they are illiterate in both languages, not that they have become estranged from their history.

At 18, through the question of nationality, the host country forces them to choose between the two countries, to declare themselves for one of two societies.

To many, the question of nationality and military service is a source of extreme tension and even causes tragedies in many families. The children born in France of Algerian parents after 1 January 1973 are French citizens until their majority.³ They must be 18 before they can choose their parents' nationality.

Confronted with all these problems which it is sometimes unable to resolve, the family unit remains the watchful guardian and the last bulwark in safeguarding its own cultural traditions in a foreign land.

The mother especially plays a vital part by upholding against all odds the type of education she received and transmitting it to her children, sometimes thus enabling them not to lose their footing in the impersonal and changing society in which they live.

Thus, Algerian religious holidays are celebrated festively by the expatriates, reflecting their need to prove themselves different, a need for an identity sustained by a system of beliefs and precepts. According to an official of the Association of Algerians in Europe, it is as if our European community, by exaggerating the outward celebration of the holidays, were trying to catch the imagination of its children by reminding them that they have a culture and a civilization different from those of the host country.

Another phenomenon which has been observed, and which many think is a reaction to the latent cultural vacuum, is the number of youths who swarm into certain neighborhood mosks--premises belonging to North Africans and which have been converted and fixed with the proceeds of collections made among the faithful to serve as places of worship, especially during Ramadan.

Mixed marriages are another source of complex and sometimes insurmountable problems for these youths.

Public opinion in both communities is usually hostile to these marriages.

According to official statistics,⁴ 1,634 Algerian men married a French woman, and 851 French men married an Algerian woman in 1979. Everybody agrees that these mixed marriages do not represent a miracle cure for the ills of immigration.

All those we talked to told us that mixed couples have to cope with terrible contradictions, neither of the partners feeling fully comfortable. Both suffer from the many insidious reservations they feel in their families, their friends, the law, and from the prospect of going back to the husband's native country.

The tragedy becomes especially hard to bear for these youths when it comes to employment: with qualifications equal or superior to that of a French native, they are not hired. Under the former government, several scenarios had been arranged to get rid of them, as of their parents: from xenophobic press campaigns to regulations which would put the worker "in transit" again, i.e. give him the status of "mere muscles" needed to meet a given economic requirement for a given time. According to many of the concerned officials we met, the problem of emigration and the young must now be analyzed with moderation to bring about a revision of the hasty judgements which are characteristic of the skin-deep xenophobia from which the native population suffers in times of economic crisis.

The young expatriates must no longer be forced to choose between a certain kind of integration—and at what price!—or being "sent back." According to those we met, the right to be different means the recognition of their right to reflect and express a different sensibility. In their opinion, the intermixing of cultures is primarily an enriching phenomenon and should not be perceived as a mutilation.

A Need to Prove Oneself Different

Nothing and nobody is spared by their accumulated resentment at seeing their lives wasted and at facing an uncertain future. According to Necera Korichi, 19, born in Argenteuil (preparing an EEUG [expansion unknown], English-German), Mounira Baghriche, 21, born in Argenteuil (finishing high school), Abdelhamid Melouka, 19, born in Nanterre, Sabri Lahmer, 19, born in Paris, and Samir Bougueroua, 18, born in Algiers, if one really wants to solve problems, priorities must be set. These problems range from the obstacles that must be cleared during the school years, to the language handicap, the question of nationality for national service, mixed marriages, the loss of confidence and religious faith, employment, and the prospects for reintegration.

Many experts believe that the cultural handicap peculiar to the expatriates, which is commonly referred to as "language difficulties," does not alone explain the position of failure and marginalization of the young expatriates; others, on the contrary, see in this phenomenon the result of cultural "confrontation" in the host country. If the child sees his family indulging in cheap pleasures, scheming or finagling and primarily concerned with obtaining quickly all benefits available, if he sees them hiding in a thicket of tricks and evasions, and "kissing the hand they cannot bite," how could he possibly form a logical system of reference, know where he stands and where he is going?

No! Most of the youths we met do not want "everything right now." They are aware of sitting between two chairs. Going to school in the host country, they notice that no value is attached to the cultural history of their country and also suffer from a harmful conditioning through hostile mass media.

What is the remedy for the traumas, for the incalculable consequences suffered by these youths who, in order to "survive," go so far as to repudiate their origins by repudiating what they are?

Some of them even "gallicize" their first names so their friends and acquaintances will forget where they came from.

You can easily imagine the bitterness of parents who see their children pathetically trying to imitate their French friends in their behavior, their language and even their clothing.

Right now, "punks" are in, with leather or imitation leather clothes that sheathe the whole body.

[10 Aug 82 p 3]

[Text] III.- Expression of a Different Sensibility

A few days ago, Abdes Fellah was still foreman in a small period furniture factory near Paris. Together with 35 other workers--all expatriates--he has just be laid off in what is discreetly and officially called "a reorganization of the enterprise."

At the request of one of the militants in the Association, we met him at home, in Nanterre, to better understand the state of mind of an expatriate who, for 18 years, contributed to the production of furniture sold all over the world and who, overnight, found himself unemployed.

Thousands of other expatriates like him were the first victims of economic recession.

But these quarrels among experts leave Mr Abdes Fellah indifferent and feeling that he is paying for a mistake he did not make. Of course, he was offered severance pay--a ridiculously low amount--and he can apply for unemployment benefits.

Working full time, he could barely meet his family's needs. What is he going to do now?

Mr Fellah has not seen the end of his troubles; his severance pay is only a small fraction of what a native worker would receive under similar conditions, a union member tells us, for the amount to be paid will not take into account the amounts regularly paid by our compatriot to the retirement fund during all the years he worked in France. It will take months of efforts, of running from office to office, and miles of red tape before he sees the end of the tunnel.

However, he said, until then he was considered as a "quiet foreigner" and even had the illusion of having succeeded.

His work as a foreman allowed him to live decently. A look at the furniture in his living-room confirms this. A small and charming house with a little garden rented under a lease renewable every third year.

His children, four daughters and two sons, are lucky enough to get an education, an advantage he did not have when he was young, he says. Recently, he admits, he felt he was losing control over the family. You do not have the authority you used to have on a 20-year-old daughter or son, he repeats in a low voice, as if to find excuses for questionable behavior.

To Resume Dialogue With One's Origins

The unemployment benefits he will receive, the equivalent of the minimum guaranteed wages, will not be enough to support his family in the style they are used to. Overwhelmed and wounded, he cannot even make plans...

To go back to Algeria? Our question makes him start, as if he woke up out of a long dream. Of course, he is thinking about it. In fact, he has never stopped thinking about it since he came to France. But he would have liked to do it under other circumstances. Besides, he tells us in a low voice and with tears in his eyes, now "the children will refuse to come with me." It is as if confiding in us had freed himself of a secret that was gnawing at him.

He is not the first head of family to make this terrible confession to us. Integrating or returning home seems to be the only choice for the young expatriate.

Naturalization--which, a social worker in charge of a reception and orientation center tells us, implies integration and assimilation--does not solve any problem, since the naturalized expatriate worker finds himself more uprooted than ever and is still considered as a second-class citizen.

Cut off from his native community, he is not for all that accepted by his adoptive family.

The social worker we talked to has heard of a number of such cases, and has often heard the same words of disappointment from those who thought naturalization would put them "across the barrier."

A survey of the Association of Algerians in Europe, the conclusions of which represent the main lines of the report on education and culture presented at its 10th General Assembly⁵ in Versailles, shows that our expatriate community is now undergoing deep internal changes which alter and disrupt its profile and its balance, and indicates that most expatriates now wish to go back home.⁶

Therefore, an end must be put to the acculturation and deculturation process which threatens the most vulnerable of the expatriates--the young--in order to safeguard their personality and their identity.

Just as the dissemination of our values through cultural activities, and the teaching of our national languages are means to achieve these objectives.

Mr Ahmed Nadir, the cultural director of the Association of Algerians in Europe, reviewed for us the action program prepared to this end at a time when warnings come from many experts who point out that new and complex problems have arisen as a result of the changing profile of the family unit which is now confronted with conflicting cultural choices of unequal appeal. This results in a modification and depreciation of the status of each member of the family.

Worse still, according to the survey, the native culture is perceived as an obstacle to social promotion and to non-differentiation within the selective host society.

Between a natural tie which it tends to reject and another which keeps it in a situation of failure and inferiority, our youth--60 percent of whom are under 25--finds it very hard to retain its balance.

Through its different activities, the Association aims at allowing them to accept their difference, to value their culture, to renew the dialogue with their origins, to open themselves to other cultures which, then, will become a determining factor in their personality.

Twenty years after our country regained its independence, an assessment of the situation shows that the average age of our expatriate youth will further decrease during the coming years, and that problems will tend to become infinitely more numerous and complicated instead of resolving themselves.

For Priority Emergency Measures

Mr Nadir points out that two phenomena have now become apparent. That of school failure:⁷ most of these children are discharged from the school system without having acquired any sort of general or vocational training--an estimated 14 percent on the average, depending on the region--and leave the French school as complete illiterates.

Delinquency and marginalization is the second phenomenon; it originates in a socially disadvantaged category, living in suburbs which are often ghettos.

It would be unrealistic, Mr Nadir also points out, to believe that these problems could be easily solved with the sole help of Algerian organizations, since all surveys to-date show that school dropouts, delinquents and drug users are found not only among our youth, but in other social categories as well, whether expatriate or French.

As a result of these findings, the authorities concerned have adopted well-defined guidelines for their efforts. A demand for a general improvement in the conditions of stay and the living conditions as well as the qualification level of these people, so specific solutions can be found in the future.

What could these solutions be? First, to organize cultural activities for this youth, then to help its reintegration in the country, Mr Nadir answers.

The legal framework for a long-range action has just been discussed by the Algerian and French governments, and an agreement was signed on 1 December 1981. This is a cooperation agreement providing for the teaching of our national language and of Algerian culture to expatriate children, starting with the next school year, 1982-1983. Among other things, Mr Nadir underlines, it was decided that language and civilization courses would be organized for expatriate children in all schools with at least 50 students.

The teaching of our national language outside school hours was also discussed by the two parties, and an outline for the organization of marginal classes was drawn. Finally, continuity of this teaching from the elementary to the secondary school received much attention, and the two parties agreed to use all means so new sections could be organized in the secondary cycle during the next school year. We must also point out that the specificity of the expatriate student quickly showed the inadequacy of the school textbooks used over here.

According to Mr Nadir, we cannot expect to complete the same programs in 24 hours per week on one side, and in only 3 hours as part of integrated education.

It had become necessary to revise the methods and contents of these textbooks so they would be better adapted to local conditions and still retain their characteristic of belonging to the Algerian school system.

After several years of experimentation and an assessment of the results, new textbooks were published and printed in France by the Association.

Messrs Tahar Benhadid and Larbi Yacoub, respectively in charge of the education department and school inspector, gave us precisions on the role and impact of these new textbooks which, since last year, also include new disciplines, like natural sciences, history, Algerian geography, etc... In order not to remain cut off from the implementation of the basic school, they add, 60,000 textbooks were printed and distributed; simultaneously, a series of other information and educational documents for a more diversified public were published, among others the "Guide for the Young Expatriate," dealing with educational profiles and higher studies at Algerian universities and institutes, a collection of official texts entitled "The Teaching of Native Languages and the Schooling of Expatriate Children, A List of Schools Where the Arabic Language Is Taught," a document on the schooling of Algerian students in the upper forms of French secondary schools, and, finally, a sheet giving all indications that could facilitate the school admission or readmission of students returning to Algeria.

Still according to Mr Nadir, the teaching of our national language is a dynamic element enabling our youth to become aware that they belong to a society, to a nation, but, alone, it does not represent a determining factor in the make-up of Algerian personality.

Therefore, the practice and development of cultural activities must be considered as a natural extension of our language and a means to appreciate it; and also as a privileged means to gain access to our national culture which is too often depreciated in the host country. Cultural life, he adds, must lead the expatriates to become aware and take charge of themselves.

Since the 10th General Assembly of the Association, two lines of action have been set to achieve this objective: the strengthening and improvement of the organizers trained during previous years, and the training of new ones, with special stress now being placed on quality.

The Association's cultural policy is intended to provide our youth with the means that will enable them to identify with their society, by helping them to take roots, and, secondly, to meet the need of workers, who are sometimes less receptive to assimilation attempts, Mr Nadir stressed.

All Algerian authorities concerned unanimously recognize that the two main characteristics of our expatriate community today are its familial character and the fact that it is getting younger. Among the young, 270,000 go to

school. These new problems call for priority emergency measures so that the young do not lose their identity under the influence of the milieu in which they live, and do not find themselves twice marginalized, both in the host country and in their own.

FOOTNOTES

1. Decree dated 14 September 1916, quoted by Mr Mauco in "Foreigners in France," a thesis published by Editions Colin, Paris 1932.
2. Mr Porcu; see LE MONDE 30 June 1979.
3. The Nationality of Young Algerians Born in France; see document published in the FASTI [expansion unknown] Bulletin, 4, Square Vitruve, 75020, Paris (February 1982).
4. "Twenty Year Old Algeria, and 20 Year Old Algerians," HOMMES ET MIGRATIONS, No 1030, Paris (April 1982).
5. Tenth General Assembly of the Association, 30-31 May 1981, Palais des Congres, Versailles (France).
6. Education and Culture. Document, pp 90-106, Association of Algerians in Europe, Paris.
7. See: The Cultural Reduction of Expatriate Children: "Squaring the Circle," EL MOUDJAHID 2 April 1981.

9294

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OFFICIAL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF GULF COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

Manama AL-BAHRAIN in Arabic No 669, 7 Jul 82 pp 9-11

[Interview with Shaykh Da'ij Ibn Khalifa al-Khalifa, Assistant Undersecretary for Ports and Customs Affairs, by Ahmad al-Sa'i, Date and Place not Specified]

[Text] The genuine leap in the process of progress and prosperity which Bahrain is experiencing began in 1962 when H.H. the Ruler of the country assumed power in the country, laying down sound bases for the growth of our beloved Bahrain. Perhaps recognition of the importance of vital facilities and their effect on the development of the economies of the country emerged in the first national tasks with the decision to construct the port of Salman which is now a port of international importance, particularly after it was expanded to enable it to handle additional numbers of large ships.

Business flourished thanks to this important facility, particularly the transit trade which now represents 27 percent of the port's income in Bahrain. During an interview with Shaykh Da'ij Ibn Khalifa al-Khalifa, Assistant Undersecretary for Ports and Customs Affairs, the following dialogue ensued:

[Question] With regard to sources of Bahraini national income, does the transit trade represent a leap by which part of the objectives of public development in the country can be achieved?

[Answer] Certainly the state derives income from the ports from the goods arriving in the country but this is not the primary objective for which the government is encouraging the transit trade. Naturally Bahrain's imports are limited as measured by local consumption. Were the situation confined to imported goods arriving for us, we would find that there would be few ships thus causing the Bahraini merchant to encounter difficulties in bringing in his goods from the east or west. However the government is constantly striving to encourage the transit trade because that increases the amount of goods and the number of ships. On the one hand the Bahraini merchant gets better opportunities for goods to move rather than experiencing a long wait that could amount to a month or more to find a ship. On the other hand, greater numbers of ships means competition and this brings lower costs, whether from Europe or America to Bahrain or from the Far East.

So, one can say that the goal behind encouraging the transit trade is to cut costs, to increase the number of ships and to give the Bahrain merchant better opportunities. This has reached the point that we now find that the transit trade here accounts for a total of 27 percent of incoming goods. Naturally revenue has resulted from this increase.

Our Country Was the Gulf Market

[Question] Do you feel that the transit trade has lost its vital character with regard to the economy of Bahrain compared with past years?

[Answer] The fact is that there are two types of transit trade. The first type involves the ships arriving at the port with goods being re-exported, the goal being to encourage the ships and their traffic. The second type arises when the merchant imports goods and then sells them to the Gulf countries.

In the past, in the 50's and 60's, the transit trade was flourishing in Bahrain and most of the goods for the area, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and even the UAE, arrived at the port of Salman during that period. However, what happened was that the countries of the area became interested in building new, large ports. We find that Dubayy now has the port of Jabal 'Ali and Saudi Arabia has the port of al-Dammam. The same is true for Kuwait and Qatar. So the merchants of the Gulf began to import goods through their ports, rather than the port of Bahrain and in this fashion Bahrain lost its standing as the flourishing Gulf market.

There Are No Shortcomings

[Question] Frankly what are the advantages and shortcomings of the transit trade system as applied in Bahrain? In your opinion, what ways are available to avoid negative aspects and to bolster positive aspects?

At this point 'Ayd 'Abdullah, Director of Ports, joined the interview.

[Answer] The fact is, I don't believe the transit trade has any shortcomings. However there were some ports that lacked the capacity or area to handle the ships carrying the transit business and because of the volume of imports, this caused a sort of congestion in the port. Consequently, taxes were imposed on goods destined for local consumption and there is no other problem except for some waiting. With regard to the port of Salman, God be praised, it is now a port with a large area and could handle twice what it presently does thanks to the equipment currently available.

Shaykh Da'ij Ibn Khalifa al-Khalifa adds:

We cannot forget to make a comparison of Bahrain's imports in 1980-1981. In 1980 imports amounted to 1.2 million tons and in 1982 they rose to 1.4 million

tons. In 1982 we expect them to amount to 1.6 million tons. This shows that there is room for increases and that the system in effect in Bahrain has positive qualities. In addition, we cannot treat the transit trade as involving only goods imported and re-exported. One must take into consideration that there are free zones. For instance, our country has provided every possible facility to encourage the transit trade and has also provided facilities to light industries. A person is permitted to import, duty free naturally, all equipment and machinery needed for a plant, and raw materials are also exempt from duties and even the plant's production exported to other countries is duty free.

[Question] The transit trade is now a economic subject which is studied in many universities in the advanced European countries. How could such a vital field be made a course of academic study which could be applied in the area of the Gulf University for Technology and the Bahrain University College?

[Answer] Shaykh Da'ij: So far there has been no full and comprehensive study given the previous conception of the importance of this vital trade. However, what the Ministry of Finance and National Economy is doing is setting up training courses, sending employees to ports which are involved in the transit trade. The most important port which we depend on at this time is the port of Singapore which depends totally on the transit trade and on the goods arriving from Malaysia and Indonesia.

'Ayd 'Abdullah adds: In recent years it has become of great importance, particularly for European colleges and especially those in the Netherlands, because of their geographic location. The port of Rotterdam is considered the key to Europe and its vital market and is quite different from the other ports of Europe. Therefore a degree in business at the general secondary level involves study of and getting some familiarity with the transit trade.

Our Hopes Are Pegged on the Cooperation of Everyone

[Question] How do you view the future of the transit trade with regard to Bahrain on the one hand and the GCC countries in general?

[Answer] Shaykh Da'ij: The development of the transit trade is primarily dependent on the nature of the services and facilities provided by each port. In Bahrain for example there is a Scandinavian company that has lines between America and Bahrain and between Japan and the Far East and Bahrain. This company serves Bahrain as a center and finds that all its large ships arrive in Bahrain and unload their goods there and then it is the small ships that distribute the goods to other ports.

Based on my responsibilities at the port, I believe that the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the merchants of Bahrain prefer to have their goods

Goods Traffic at Port of Salman
(Figures in Freightage Tons)

January, February, March, April	Total Imports	Total Imports and Exports	Goods		Total Goods Containers	Number of Containers		Number of Containers Exchanged
			Bahrain	Goods Transit		Bahrain	Transit	
1981	400,033	561,932	115,789	67,447	183,336	5,288	6,027	23,789
1982	477,916	669,914	186,527	122,656	309,183	7,607	8,474	30,984
Increase	19%	19%	61%	81%	69%	44%	41%	30%

go to other ports and, subsequently, be exported to Bahrain. Concerning the cooperation of the GCC countries, we hope that there will be cooperation and agreement among brothers in the area on the flourishing of this trade.

Our hopes are pegged on our coming meeting in the city of Riyadh to be held to lay down sound bases and rules.

8389

CSO: 4404/595

PRESIDENT ISSUES DECREE TIGHTENING UP BORDERS WITH LIBYA

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH in Arabic No 27, 8 Jul 82 pp 1857-59

/Decree: "Decree 304 of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt for 1982 Securing the Military Area Adjacent to the Western Borders of the Republic"/

/Text/ The president:

Having read the constitution:

Law 162 for 1958 on the state of emergency;

The law on military verdicts issued by Law 25 for 1966; And Presidential Decree 560 for 1981 declaring a state of emergency: Has decreed:

Article One. The provisions and rules accompanying this decree on securing the area adjacent to the western borders of the Arab Republic of Egypt are in effect.

Article Two. This decree will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH and it will be in effect as of 17 June 1982.

Issued by the Office of the Presidency on 23 June 1982.

/Signed/ Husni Mubarak.

Provisions and Rules Accompanying Presidential Decree 304 for 1982 Securing the Military Area Adjacent to the Western Borders of the Republic

1. It is prohibited for foreigners to be present in the area adjacent to the western borders of the Arab Republic of Egypt, as well as Egyptians who did not have ordinary residence there, with their possessions, prior to 5 June 1967, except by written permission of the military body which will be specified by a decree issued by the minister of defence.

People in the Governorate of Matruh who were in permanent residence, with their possessions, in the jurisdiction of the governorate before the date mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be permitted to be present and will not be required to have written permits written out to that effect; a review of an investigation to establish their identity will be sufficient.

2. People who are not in the armed forces, government employees whose official work requires that they be present in the al-Sallum Heights and the confines of

the western border extending south of that along the western political boundaries for a depth of 20 kilometers inside the territory of the republic, and people who have permits authorized by the abovementioned military body, are prohibited from being in these areas.

3. It is prohibited to use any vehicle, means of transport of any capacity or pickup truck of 2 tons' capacity or less outfitted with heavy-duty transmissions or for them to be present or move about in the prohibited areas included in this decree.

Pickup trucks of 2 tons' capacity or less which are not outfitted with heavy-duty transmissions will be permitted to move about in accordance with rules and regulations which will be specified by a decree issued by the minister of defense.

Vehicles belonging to or working with the security agencies, civil police, service departments and agencies or local units in the Governorate of Matruh, as well as vehicles belonging to or working with public sector companies in redevelopment projects in accordance with a permit issued by the Border Guard Forces, will be exempted from this prohibition.

The movements of persons and vehicles that are permitted to be present in the military area stipulated in this decree will be restricted to the paved road (Matruh-Narrani-al-Sallum) as well as the Matruh-Siwah road and the easement parallel to it alongside the telephone lines extending to Siwah, unless anything different is stipulated in the permit granted.

4. Anyone violating the provisions of Paragraphs One, Two or Three or trying to infiltrate the western border of the republic in an illegal manner will be punished by imprisonment for a period of no less than 6 months, and the vehicle or means of transport used in this infiltration will be confiscated.

The owners of vehicles violating the provisions of Paragraph Three will be punished by a fine of no less than 100 pounds and no more than 500 pounds.

Transportation vehicles outfitted with heavy duty transmissions whose confiscation is decreed for crimes of infiltration across the western boundaries will be assigned to the Border Guard or other forces by decree of the Ministry of Defense.

5. The armed forces alone will bear the responsibility of guarding the western boundaries of the republic, including legal points of passage through these borders, buildings housing customs and the paved road extending from the western borders to the town of Marsa Matruh, in addition to the responsibilities imposed upon them by virtue of this decree.

The local government agencies will assume responsibility for security within areas of population concentration in the military area.

6. The military judiciary will have jurisdiction over the following crimes committed in the abovementioned military zone, no matter who commits them:

A. Crimes detrimental to the security of the state, whether from abroad or domestically.

B. Crimes of the possession of weapons, ammunition or explosives and smuggling crimes of all types and forms.

C. Crimes committed in violation of the provisions of this decree and the rules and provisions accompanying it.

7. All cases related to the crimes referred to in the provisions and rules accompanying this decree which have not been filed before the competent judiciary bodies will be submitted to the military judiciary.

The minister of defense will issue a decree establishing military prosecutor's offices and forming military courts competent to review these cases in accordance with the requirements of the Law on Military Verdicts.

11887

CSO: 4504/433

PROBLEMS OF COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION AGENCY EXPLORED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 706, 26 Jul 82 pp 16-18

/Article by Kamal Jaballah: "An Urgent /Letter/ to the Prime Minister: The Commercial Representation /Agency/ Is in Serious Trouble!"

/Text/ When AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, on more than one occasion, warned of the gravity of the situation the Commercial Representation Agency has been going through for about 6 months and the great losses which the agency has endured as a result of its expulsion from the location in which it is operating (which in turn has been reflected on Egypt's foreign trade activity and the course of the balance of trade between Egypt and various countries of the world at a time when we have been earnestly striving to develop exports and guide the importation process, which is the commercial attache's prime mission), no official budged. It was as if we were delivering a Moslem call to prayer in Malta. The people responsible for this imbroglio are also incapable of making decisions. They have nothing but sympathy and the expressing of good feelings toward people working in the commercial service. The foremost of these officials is the deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs, and the person with the least involvement is the minister of economy, whose base of operations has been approached by the danger, which is only a few days off. We have been hearing cries for help emanating from his office, which is the last bastion of the Commercial Representation /Agency/ in Lazughli. It has been besieged by the Ministry of Justice and its supply lines have been cut. Discussions are still underway over having the chairman of the Commercial Representation Agency keep his office in the building, but the Ministry of Justice is rejecting this and threatening to use force. The other people working in the commercial service agency have all been "crammed" into a dilapidated old building. Since they are all in a single room in this building, along with their work, chaos rules, bags, files and reports have been scattered around, and the people are sitting either on top of them or alongside them. One need not mention other rare and exotic sights which are comforting to neither friend nor enemy!

Faced with the tough situation the Commercial Representation Agency is going through, we offer this pictorial report.

The first meeting was with the minister without portfolio, Muhammad Hilmi 'Atiyah, chairman of the League of Commercial Representatives. The man was almost in tears over what had happened to him and his colleagues, the lowly way in which the

Ministry of Justice had been dealing with them, and the dishonorable destiny that had befallen them. The league chairman stated, "What the Commercial Representation /Agency/ has now been facing for about half a year has been a 'tribulation' whose grievous consequences in the local and foreign levels God alone knows." In order that we could see this tribulation with our own eyes, he accompanied me to the large room in which his colleagues were working. It was full of desks, people, typewriters, files, reports and bags. There were no services or contacts with the outer world there. Some people refused to talk to /AL-AHRAM/ AL-IQTISADI or to have their pictures taken, lest that diminish their standing in the public's eyes and lessen the powers of the commercial service. When AL-IQTISADI insisted, out of solicitude for their interests, the league chairman stated, whispering in my ear "'Show magnanimity for a beloved people who have become diminished.' These people never expected that it would be their fate to go into the streets, as is the case now, for reasons they have nothing to do with! Look at these bags and the stack of files and reports alongside them. By God, how can one work in this wretched atmosphere? The building is about to collapse and was abandoned years ago. Rats are threatening the documents and reports. The real embarrassment arises when someone in a foreign delegation thinks of visiting us. Although that is the essence of our job, we avoid him. What is the solution? Government intervention is necessary."

"What do you mean by government intervention?"

He said, "I ask Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister, to intervene, especially since the ministers involved (the ministers of economy and justice)--and indeed the deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs--have not settled this situation, because we have been put out in the streets. Because of the severe difficulties that are facing us at our place of work, people are doing their work at home after official working hours, which we are also observing. There is no place to sign trade protocols or conclude agreements with foreign countries, and we are compelled to do that in hotels, which unworthy behavior in terms of form and substance."

I left the chairman of the league and saw the wonder of wonders on my way to the office of the chairman of the Commercial Representation Agency. It is difficult to make one's way through the preventive barrier of all types and kinds of objects. I asked 'Adil al-Jarihi, the first deputy minister of economy and chairman of Commercial Representation: "What are the causes that have brought you to this situation?"

'Adil al-Jarihi said, "I resisted being expelled from the building until the agency could be given another one in keeping with the nature of its work. In fact, 1 million pounds were allocated for the purchase or rental of a new building (last October). However, procedures, red tape and committees took more time than necessary. The Ministry of Justice did not neglect us, and it finished us off. The minister of economy tried to help, but all attempts were futile in the face of the obstinacy of the Ministry of Justice." He stated, "Even though there are no places or resources for the Commercial Representation Agency in the present circumstances, the people working there are exerting redoubled efforts and are working night and

and day at home so that the Egyptian commercial offices abroad will not suffer any disturbances! The fear is that we will keep on like this, and there certainly will be a negative effect on Egypt's foreign trade."

I asked, "Now that you are in fact out in the street, what plans are you making for the future?"

Minister without portfolio Ahmad al-Minkawi, manager of service affairs in Commercial Representation, said "All the officials sympathize with us, but sympathy alone is not enough! In fact rapid, immediate measures must be taken and the matter must be resolved by purchasing or renting a suitable place for the people working in Commercial Representation. The Commercial Representation Agency is a state government agency; it is not in the private sector. If the government is unable to provide a place for commercial representation, which is one of its own agencies, who can we turn to?"

11887

CSO: 4504/434

WAYS FOR IMPROVING DOMESTIC EXPORT PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 26 Jul 82 p 7

/Article by al-'Izab al-Tayyib: "In the Most Recent Specialized National Council Study: How Can the Protection of Domestic Production be Carried out?"/

/Text/ Protecting local production ought to be a fixed, basic national objective. This is underlined by the most recent specialized national council study, by the one issued by the National Council for Production and Economic Affairs.

This study was made as a result of the urgent desire to have production regain its national status and perspective and in an attempt to see the good name of "Made in Egypt" on every producer. The bitter fact is that we have lost much of this good name in the last 10 years.

At that time, the emphasis was on applying the liberalization policy to import activities alone and not on the real protection of domestic production.

In fact, the situation reached the point where there was deterioration in many industries; the reason was that they did not receive attention since there were imported equivalents to their output. Protecting domestic production, as the study asserts, reflects the necessities and requirements of further growth and investment in technological development, as well as the requirements of development and its difficult circumstances; these demand first of all that optimum use be made of available resources which, by their nature, are limited and scarce, in order to cope with the aspirations and hopes that are pinned on development plans and programs. This requires optimum organization and planning with an integrated scope.

Why Protection?

The study embodies the conclusions of discussions and studies which took place on the protection of domestic output, in the following points:

The actual state of public and private sector industrial production dictates that a strong policy be adopted with the aim of protecting production. This is made mandatory by the fact that various projects and production units are suffering from a lack of investments needed for replacement and renovation operations and the performance of new expansions and the fact that Egyptian industry continues to use

machinery and equipment whose hypothetical operating life has ended, in contrast with the technological progress being realized internationally in similar equipment and machinery, and its repercussions on reduced production costs.

The Actual State of Production

The actual state of industrial production points to an obvious drop in worker productivity, and that is reflected by many bottlenecks, including an inevitable increase in wages along with the setting of sales prices of industrial products, the low production skill of workers and a scarcity of skilled labor.

The public industrial sector's problems, especially in the fields of administration, high production costs, the drop in productivity and quality, replacement, renovation and new expansion requirements and the need to establish new industries in areas the sector had not previously addressed itself to dictate a period of protection which will be long enough for people to catch their breaths and set public sector's house back in order from within, especially since economic liberalization policy companies have suddenly been exposed to the dangers of unequal local and foreign competition.

With the requirements of foreign currency, and the intense need for such currency for financing the foundations of development and the essential food commodity and consumer imports needed to meet the daily nutritional requirements of the broad group of citizens, the objective of guiding imports from abroad becomes a national requirement for the sake of a development without which it will not be possible to provide the requisite appropriate climate for progress.

The Customs Tariff Weapon

The use of the customs tariff weapon as a means for protecting local production has not realized the desired objectives in the context of the import statutes and rules applies since 1976 and the expanded manifestations of smuggling, especially with the establishment of free zones and the free city in Port Said, as well as the expanded scope of customs exemptions under the aegis of the investment law and special laws and decrees.

There are development requirements which circumstances dictate be realized at the fastest possible rates. These are concentrated in increasing local industrial and agricultural production rates in order to meet increased consumption requirements. That cannot be achieved in a context where imports from abroad are given free rein without rules or restrictions on the pretext of liberalization and liberalization requirements, because there are requirements and needs which take precedence over them and it is mandatory that economic policy, with all its weapons and tools, get in motion on behalf of development, of which liberalization is considered to be an auxiliary tool. Consequently, one cannot allow that to be transformed into a restriction on or an obstacle to development,

The Protection That Is Intended

However, the study does set forth a number of warnings in this regard. These may be summarized as:

The fact that the requisite protection of domestic industry does not mean spoiling local producers at the expense of the consumer. Protection cannot take place at the expense of development, competent administration of development and the proper use and deployment of available resources. Consequently, protection must occur in the context of the interests of development and the interests of the consumer in order to realize specific objectives which are linked to a clear schedule.

Protection absolutely does not mean prohibiting and restricting imports in a manner which will result in depriving the Egyptian economy of such requisite basic ingredients of productive processes as raw materials, production accessories, machinery, equipment and spare parts.

Protection does not mean restricting imports of basic, essential commodities whose consumption requirements cannot be met by local production.

Here the notion of protection is linked not just to the protection of local production in confrontation with foreign imports for consumption in the local market: it also entails the creation of an appropriate climate for local export production and the opening of new foreign markets for such production.

It is necessary to study the status of industrial output in some companies where Ministry of Industry reports indicate there has been a production decline as a result of competition from imports and the fact that they have been compelled to reduce their output by operating a single shift or shutting down some production lines. This requires a careful study of the role of protection in operating idle industrial capacity.

The requisite notion of protection must take stock of the increased added value which the domestic economy realizes through the available raw materials and intermediate commodities whose manufacture can be expanded locally and consequently the ability to do without foreign imports in these areas and sectors.

The notion of the goals of protection must be expanded to include encouragement of the use of raw materials and mineral resources available in Egypt. That can be done through national plans for using and providing these resources.

Protection by What Means?

In conclusion, the study proposes a number of measures and recommendations for protecting domestic output. These include:

First, encouraging domestic products by reducing taxes and customs tariffs on capital machinery and equipment, since these are the main tools of production. The reduction of costs of production is also a necessity if one is to enable domestic products to compete with their imported equivalents; that must be of a volume suitable to provide for the growing industries' production until the potential for their solidity and perseverance becomes fully available. It is also necessary to provide protection for old industries by modernizing their equipment,

introducing modern technology, raising the level of worker competence, raising productive competence in general and correcting their financial structures. In this regard, the study devotes special attention to the textile and readymade clothing industries.

Second, in order to protect domestic products from competition from smuggled foreign commodities, it is necessary to devote attention to anti-smuggling agencies, the customs guard and customs security, to raise their levels, and to seek to eliminate the special free customs zones by turning them into general free zones where there are rules for customs and technical oversight.

Third, developing industrial public sector administration, eliminating obstacles to production and marketing, introducing /illegible/ technology, giving attention to training, and creating technical and economic staffs and skilled labor in a manner which will result in a rise in the level of quality, reduction of costs and the attainment of abundant production.

Fourth, guiding imports by refusing to permit the importation of goods for which there are local production equivalents. The study demands that this method be used only if the method of taxes and customs duties is inadequate to realize its objective, that presentations to the consumption guidance committee be restricted to goods for which there are local production equivalents in adequate volumes at high levels of quality, that that be done for limited periods in the case of imports, and that the prohibition decrees be preceded by studies on the status of goods in the market so that no bottlenecks occur in the market.

Fifth, increasing contact with international markets, supporting and diversifying exports to include all domestic products, if only at a low rate, in order to guarantee that quality and costs reach the level of international products, and developing competitive ability domestically and abroad.

Sixth, benefiting from economic groups and international agreements to encourage export industries.

The study requests that there be coordination among all these approaches in the framework of a development strategy with development priorities at the domestic level and at the level of various productive and service sectors.

The question that arises in the wake of every study which any body carries out is, What next? Is it possible to carry out these measures and recommendations? How so? That is a question that remains to be answered!

11887


CSO: 4504/435

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF GULF WAR CONSIDERED

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 2, Jun 82 pp 381-394

[Article by Shahram Chubin: "The Iran-Iraq War: Paradoxes and Peculiar Aspects"]


[Text] The Iran-Iraq war, which broke out in September, 1980, gives no sign of coming to an end. It is the first conflict of any particular importance in the Persian Gulf area since the beginning of the century. Its origins and the course of its development have surprised many observers and contradicted the forecasts of analysts as much as those of the parties involved themselves. The explanation for a good part of these errors of forecast may be found in a mistaken appreciation of the circumstances in which this war has unfolded and in the tendency to wish to apply to it models drawn from preceding conflicts which shook the Third World. However, and although the backdrop of the Iran-Iraq war is no doubt different, analysis of this conflict is not an insurmountable task for all of that. In fact, many of the errors made should be attributed to the excessive haste of certain Western observers to credit the belligerents with their own system of values and to over-estimate the impact of technology. Therefore, the first important question is to decide to what point the war involving Iraq and Iran is representative of Third World conflicts. The following reflections may provide some facts which may help to orient later considerations.



Iraq-Iran: The Border Area

Key:


- | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| (1) Border | (7) 500 meters | (13) Bandar-Khomeini |
| (2) Main Road | (8) 1,000 meters | (14) Qasr |
| (3) Railroad | (9) Over 1,000 meters | (15) Kuwait |
| (4) River | (10) Marshy Area | (16) Al Faw |
| (5) Contour Lines | (11) Petroleum-producing Area | (17) Gulf |
| (6) 200 meters | (12) Qasr-Shirin | |



The Front in December 1981

Key:

- (1) Occupied by Iraq
- (2) Qasr-e-Shirin
- (3) Khorramshahr
- (4) Khuzestan
- (5) Khorramshahr
- (6) Basra
- (7) Shatt-al Arab
- (8) A l Faw
- (9) Kuwait
- (10) Gulf



The Front in April 1982

Key:

- (1) Occupied by Iraq
- (2) Qasr-e-Shirin
- (3) Khuzestan
- (4) Khorramshahr
- (5) Basra
- (6) Shatt-al Arab
- (7) Kuwait
- (8) A l Faw
- (9) Gulf

Predictions, Forecasts, and Paradoxes

Throughout the 1970's it was the conventional wisdom in American liberal circles to consider that there was an unavoidable, cause and effect relationship between military expenditures, the armaments race, and the outbreak of war. This belief was applied in an inflexible and unimaginative way to the situation in the Persian Gulf. Accepted and adapted by "progressive" elements in the Arab world, this belief began to spread through a whole series of simple propositions: that the strengthening of Iranian military power threatened its Arab neighbors, that Iran's relations with the United States and Israel were a real insult to the principle of non-alignment and even to Islam, and therefore that Iran constituted a danger for the Arabs, right after Israel. The object of this campaign was clear. It sought to ensure that Iran would reduce its purchases of arms and become truly non-aligned by breaking its close relations with the United States and supporting the Palestinian cause. Then it would live happily with its Arab neighbors.

It was clearly when all these conditions were met that war with Iraq broke out. This was a result of the fact that the deterioration of Iranian military power, combined with the strident proclamation of its non-alignment and its militant stand in favor of Islam and the Palestinian cause, had no other consequences than alienating it from its neighbors, while depriving it of the means needed to discourage an attack on their part. Regarding the states of the Persian Gulf, and whatever the rhetoric of Arab-Iranian relations during the 1970's, they began to look back on that period with a certain nostalgia.

After the fall of the Shah, certain analysts had a tendency to consider, not that this brusque change represented a destabilizing factor in itself, but rather that the United States had made a poor choice, both in terms of the country as well as the model. Iraq, these analysts were saying, could be a more reliable friend, even if it was more independent. However, they were forgetting the strategic aspect of the problem. In fact, with or without the Islamic revolution Iran would remain the key to security in the region, the strategic pivot of Southwest Asia.

Another hope which was to be destroyed by events was that the war would be short. In 1976 an excellent, widely distributed report on arms sales had concluded that Iran was incapable "of conducting a war in the next 5 to 10 years with its present and future resources without day to day American aid." This conclusion made reference to the use of "sophisticated" weapons, but this clarification was ignored. Thus, many people thought at the outbreak of hostilities that the two antagonists would rapidly run out of breath and that they would then turn to their principal arms suppliers, providing them with means to exercise pressure. This reasoning was based on the precedent of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and on experience with other conflicts in the Middle East or in the Indian sub-continent, which were rapidly brought to an end after short and violent fighting.

Now for reasons which were both political and technical such reasoning was not relevant. In fact, the causes of this new war were essentially political. They were fighting for an idea, not for territory. This determined not only the way in which the war was fought but also its importance in the eyes of the two adversaries and their willingness to continue to fight, whatever it might cost. Regarding the technological dimension, this was also poorly appreciated by the Westerners and particularly by the Americans, who attributed to this factor overwhelming importance, capable of making up for all weaknesses. Now the peoples of the Third World above all attribute symbolic importance to modern weapons, paying only limited attention to their capacity to make the best use of them. In a war of this kind, dominated by great attrition in equipment, such optimum use of weapons is beside the point. It is doubtful that better utilization of available technology would have made it possible to affect significantly the consequences of an Iraqi strategic decision which was so manifestly rash. On the other hand the view that the belligerents were totally incapable of making use of their modern weapons was just as false. By means of improvisation, "cannibalization," and imaginative (if not wise) use, it is always possible to find some use, one way or another, for the most highly-developed equipment. In short, neither the thesis of a blitzkrieg or the concept of incompetence brought much understanding to the initial forecasts of the way in which operations would unfold. No more the pointless attempt by American official departments to see in the war a certain "syndrome of madness," in the course of which each of the belligerents reportedly would be tempted to inflict unlimited damage on the infrastructure of the other (as opposed to the Western concept of controlled escalation, with prior warning of each step).

This war has confounded still other forecasts. For years, for example, some analysts never stopped predicting that a conflict in the particularly sensitive region of the Persian Gulf would rapidly degenerate into general conflict, involving the intervention of all the neighboring states and of the super-powers, with the worst consequences for the supply and price of oil. Nothing like that happened. The war has not expanded, although this might have happened without the Western warning to Iran. Within the region most states--not all of them--have supported Iraq as the lesser of two evils. The super-powers, in their process of transferring their relations with their former partners, have thought that it was in their interest not to show too openly their support for one or the other of the adversaries. While not wishing to break its ties with Iraq, Moscow in fact and despite apparent "neutrality" has favored Iran,* taking into account its strategic importance in the region. Regarding the Americans, they shared the Soviet point of view, while still

*There are many indications in support of this fact, such as the warning to Iran of the imminence of an Iraqi attack, the offer of armaments and the indirect support by satellites of the USSR and the ingenuous statement by a Soviet official that the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty was a "peace treaty and not a war treaty."

considering the Iraqi regime a threat to the whole Persian Gulf area. Hence the limited role of the two superpowers in the conflict, but with an important difference, nevertheless. That is, the USSR has diplomatic relations with the two belligerents, whereas the United States has relations with neither of them.

That a war in this region, which has resulted in the loss of some 4 million barrels of world oil production per day, could have no impact on the price of crude oil would have seemed unthinkable at the beginning of the 1980's. Not only has the price of crude oil not increased but it continues to drop after 2 years of conflict. At the beginning of the 1980's this would have seemed a completely absurd development. An analysis of this phenomenon goes beyond the purview of this article, but mentioning such aberrations shows how much humility you have to show when you consider this affair.

Two other factors are generally deserving of being mentioned in closing this chapter. The first was the hope held by the states of the Persian Gulf of seeing the war between the two northern countries take up all of their strength and thus prevent them from harming their common neighbors. The sporadic bombardments--perhaps accidental--of Kuwait by the Iranians, the propaganda on their radio, and their implication in an abortive coup d'etat in Bahrain in December, 1981, disappointed this expectation. In the same way the cost of the war and the erosion of the initial Iraqi tactical advantage have involved the other Persian Gulf countries in political and financial difficulties, further strengthening the already evident relationship between the outbreak of the conflict and the stability of the region.

The second factor relates to the irrepressible enthusiasm of some parties for the adoption of regional solutions for regional problems. It seems that the supporters of this approach are very sensitive to the fact that this would make it possible to exclude external powers and the complications which they would bring to the problem. However, they have a tendency to forget that this kind of solution is rarely possible to achieve, due to the fact that all of the countries of the region are more or less directly concerned with a specific interest in a particular issue. The Islamic Conference is no more in a position to act in a united way or Saudi Arabia to act impartially than Syria or the non-aligned countries. Regarding the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional organization established in 1981 to act in united fashion, its efforts have ended, not without a certain irony, in an admission of disunity. In fact, Iran remains the principal motive for unity.

Special Aspects

The Gulf war differs from other conflicts which might be expected in the other regions of the Third World by at least one factor of significant importance. That is, it involves two well-armed countries which are rich enough to restock

their arsenals by paying cash. In other respects this war cannot be compared to the others, either in terms of its origins or in its motivation. Its cause is not essentially or even principally territorial in nature. Its origins lie in the ideological differences between two antagonistic regimes, organized according to profoundly different ways. One of them is a militant Islamic regime. The other is pragmatic, non-religious, and Arab nationalist in its Ba'th socialist variant. Neither the location of the frontier between the two countries nor an alleged "centuries-old rivalry" between Iranians and Arabs provides convincing explanations for this war.

A surprising fact is the excessive optimism shown in each of the opposing camps regarding the vulnerability of the other internally. The Iraqis expected that a strong military drive into Iranian territory would stimulate the opponents of Khomeyni, including the still restive Arab minority in Kurdistan. On their side the Iranians expected--and they still expect--the same kind of mass uprising of the large Iraqi Shi'ite community. On both sides they had underestimated the degree of integration of these minorities which the modernization of the two countries achieved.

However, the Iraqi error was much more serious. It can be summed up as a combination of an initial miscalculation and the poor conduct of military operations. There are numerous cases in modern history where we have seen a nation divided up to that point achieve a kind of "sacred union" under a controversial leader when the country found itself threatened from abroad. The objective of the Iraqi attack has never been quite clear. It might have aimed at overthrowing Khomeyni. That could have been done, or least been attempted, with greater prospects for success by using indirect means and without the risk of catalyzing Iranian nationalism. If, on the other hand, the Iraqi objective was to throw a stone into the Gulf political pond and to demonstrate its local hegemony by wiping out an historic and rather unpopular enemy, it would have been little concerned over seeing its attack strengthen the Khomeyni regime. The fact that the Iraqis did not understand that these two objectives were contradictory, implying totally different strategies, is at the heart of their strategic blunder. Thus, from the very beginning the outbreak of war led them out onto a cliff. In effect, inflicting a humiliating defeat on Iran could only strengthen Khomeyni's position, while his overthrow required a willingness to renounce this kind of striking action and also required adopting the pretense of becoming "the new power in the Gulf." Unable to choose between these two, contradictory objectives, Saddam Hussein showed that he was astonishingly blind in the face of an apparent reality, that is, that revolutions prosper in adversity and that foreign threats--real or invented for the purpose--constitute their best kind of nourishment, if not their very reason for existence.

In such a context it was highly improbable that revolutionary Iran, with its great advantage of strategic depth and numerical superiority, would be disposed

to beg for peace in exchange for a few parcels of lost territory. To this miscalculation was added the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi high command. In effect a rapid military victory, resulting in the occupation of a substantial part of Iranian territory, could reasonably have led to a favorable political settlement, on condition that it was rapidly exploited and that it demonstrated the unquestioned military superiority of Iraq. However, it was none of these. The commitment of insufficient forces to carry on the offensive, the fear of losses, and the slowness of the assault provided an image which was completely opposed to that of an implacable and determined adversary.

From the first months of the war it was therefore extremely easy to foresee the way in which the operations were developing. Incapable of achieving a military victory rapidly, Iraq found itself condemned to a long war of attrition with violent battles on a sporadic basis, in the course of which the opposing forces were able to gain a certain number of advantages in the political or psychological sphere. Strengthened by a mixture of revolutionary zeal and a martyr complex, the Iranian revolutionary guards were ready to attack Iraqi positions without any great concern for the eventual losses which they might suffer. For the Iranian regime the pursuit of the war serves several objectives: the proof that imperialism still constitutes a threat, which is a factor working for national cohesion, and the maintenance of the idea that the revolutionary concept is still valid in the international arena, particularly with a view to exporting it, in the first place, throughout the whole Middle East.

The longer the war lasted, the more Iraq lost its initial advantage. Wishing to avoid losses and incapable of knowing how to exploit their first military successes in the political field, the Iraqis redefined almost daily the conditions for a settlement of the conflict, which contrasts violently with the shattering statements made by Saddam Hussein of soon it will be 2 years ago.

From many points of view and whatever the sources to which you refer, the war has already been very costly to the two sides. On the Iranian side it is estimated that the human losses are about 50,000 dead and 200,000 wounded. For the Iraqis these figures reportedly total 30,000 dead and 100,000 wounded. In addition, there reportedly are about 1.5 million refugees without shelter among the Iranians living in the combat zone.

Regarding the economic cost, it is also considerable. Here again the big losses are the Iraqis, because their regime had made substantial achievements, while the Iranian revolution had practically ruined the country. Coming from a higher point, the downfall of the Iraqis is therefore much more deeply felt.

The Iraqis themselves have admitted that they would need between 5 and 7 years to repair the damage to their petroleum installations. It has been calculated that the war is presently costing them about \$1.0 billion per month, which has

required them to enter into loans from the Persian Gulf states which total about \$22 billion. Their financial reserves, estimated at \$25 to \$30 billion before the war, have been reduced by half and are now between \$12 and \$15 billion. Exports of crude oil have gone from 4 million to 900,000 barrels per day, bringing in no more than \$10 billion per year. However, non-military imports on an annual basis have been estimated at about \$18 billion. Saddam Hussein does not want to make his people bear the cost of the war, and, as he can count on rich allies, it is possible for him to limit the consequences of the conflict for the economy of his country. But that will be to the prejudice of Iraqi influence in the Arab world and in the non-aligned countries.

With an inflation in the order of 30 percent, a shortage of food, and a rapid fall in petroleum income, Iran for its part is suffering from a lack of foreign exchange by reason of the decline in its reserves and the sale of its gold. There is little left of the \$15 to \$20 billion which the regime inherited when it entered power. Further, Iran must import part of its requirements for refined petroleum products (middle distillates), food, raw materials, and arms, most of the latter coming at high prices from the international market. The margin between the cost of imports and income has steadily declined in the course of the past year, and there is little hope of finding other sources of income. With more than 1.0 million refugees to house and feed the regime has tried to enter into agreements with its neighbors, the countries of Eastern Europe, Uruguay, or other countries. However, petroleum production, which is now ranging between 600,000 and 800,000 barrels per day, has little chance of rising again, and Iran has been forced to have recourse to price reductions harmful to the other members of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. Quite recently, the Iranian government decided to auction off the jewels of the National Treasury in order to obtain additional income.

Although more substantial in absolute terms than those of Iraq, Iran's losses are proportionately less in view of its larger population. Moreover, the willingness of the Iranians to sacrifice themselves to preserve the territorial integrity of their country is much greater than that of the Iraqis, who are mobilized for a war they have little hope of winning and in which they see less and less point in continuing. Furthermore, Iran's losses are not really significant. The economic consequences of the conflict, the poor leadership displayed, and the motivation of the Iraqis for what they considered, in some sense, as a preventive war justified by the presence of a hostile neighbor, are so many factors which have contributed to discouraging a large number of sympathizers of the Iraqi regime, both within the country and abroad. And now this regime is nothing more than a living model of rigidity and intolerance.

The war presents still another curious, peculiar aspect, in terms of the political alignments to which it has led. Iraq appeared to be the protector of the conservative states of the Persian Gulf, whereas Jordan had little by little withdrawn its support for them. At the same time Syria, dominated by the

Alawi regime, had made common cause with the Iranian Shi'ite regime. Khomeyni's Iran, on the other hand, is now extending its conflict with Iraq to the whole region, including Lebanon. This situation presents several anomalies.

In the first place, we should recognize that a Muslim and anti-Zionist Iran would turn out to be much more of a factor for disunity in Arab politics than the imperial Iranian regime was, which was clearly more aligned. Then, and whatever its other promises of good conduct, the new Iran gave much more the impression of following a line of conduct inspired by Shi'ism than what one might have expected from a purely Muslim state. How can you explain in other terms the hostility shown by President Assad of Syria toward the Muslim Brotherhood? Finally, it should be noted that Syria and Israel have always united their efforts on behalf of Tehran and against Baghdad. However, it would be an exaggeration to pretend that there was a form of active collaboration between Israel and Syria to support Iran against Iraq. Nevertheless, there existed a kind of political convergence in the practical sphere. The implication was clear: despite the rhetoric, the Syrians are more interested in the weakening of their neighbors and Ba'th rivals than in the strengthening of Arab unity against the Israeli threat. The reason for this is equally clear. For the Syrians Iraq constitutes a threat to their regime, whereas Israel is only an eventual threat to their territory. On the Israeli side, by contrast, and despite the long term threat which the new Iranian regime, based on the Islamic revolution, represents, the first priority is the weakening of the Iraqi regime which is near their frontier.

The future development of the conflict is foreseeable within certain limits. Iran will continue to achieve tactical successes and will probably succeed in throwing the Iraqi forces out of its territory. However, a return to the pre-status quo has little chance of satisfying the Iranians, given the conflict which has taken place on their territory and which has cost them a great deal. However, if the Iranians decide to carry on the war on Iraqi soil, they will have to face up to a considerable number of problems. First of all, in the technical sphere the absence of air support for ground operations constitutes a serious handicap.

In the political arena an invasion of Iraq would sound the alarm bells in all the countries of the Persian Gulf and also in the countries of the West, bringing with it greater intervention from abroad. For its part Iraq is searching for a political solution which would let them avoid losing too much face. Unable in the foreseeable future to extricate themselves from the situation in which they have lost their way, the Iraqis hope that the leadership of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, which should be held in September, 1982, will be able to help them. For the moment, time is working terribly against them, and the Iranians know this very well.

In short, there is little chance that this war will end in a clear military victory. If a compromise is not reached, and it seems that this is what should be expected, the outcome will be in favor of the side which has the most reserves remaining, both militarily and economically. Although Iran has some advantages here, it nevertheless suffers from a lack of foreign exchange which it cannot get from friendly countries--although Iraq can do so. It is not inconceivable that the conflict will end following a change of regime involving one or the other of the belligerents. Nevertheless, and whatever the different means or processes applied to achieve an end to the conflict, these means or processes have little chance of succeeding, given the deep hostility which continues to develop between the two countries. Hence, exhaustion seems to be the factor which will most probably succeed in bringing an end to this war.

The superpowers are playing a rather marginal role in this affair, which may seem rather strange, given its importance. Without officially taking part they are tacitly supporting the two adversaries by providing them indirectly with military supplies. A threat against Saudi Arabia would require the Americans to react by sending troops to that country, which Moscow wants to avoid at all costs. If neither of the two superpowers wants to see the war spread, they still don't have the same point of view regarding the development of the conflict. On the American side it is considered that an end to hostilities would dispose of a source of trouble which weakens the two antagonists without any valid reason. Furthermore, the resumption of normal petroleum production in the two countries would accentuate tensions within OPEC in a period of superabundance of petroleum, weakening if not breaking up the united front of the producing countries.

The Soviet position is somewhat different. In effect, a weakening of OPEC and the decline in the price of crude oil which would follow it would directly affect the price of their own petroleum. Furthermore, a settlement of the conflict would put an end to the continuing appeals of the two belligerents for the provision of arms, due to Iran's having increased its dependency on the Soviet Union in the armaments field since the beginning of the war, whereas Iraq has not been able to reduce its own dependence on the Soviet Union. The range of Soviet options in this war has always been more extensive than certain observers have imagined. In fact the Soviets have never clearly indicated their intention of openly taking sides for Iran or for Iraq, no more than they have done as between Syria and Iraq. They have left open the widest possible range of options, even going so far as to conclude a friendship treaty with the vacillating regime of President Assad in the autumn of 1980. Not wishing to choose, the Soviets are ready, on the other hand, to take some political risks. They tend to remain in a position which prevents the normalization of relations between Iran and the Western world, on the one hand, and which allows them to keep their influence over Saddam Hussein or his successors, on the other hand.

If, despite all expectations, Iran should become capable of deploying the military means allowing it to strike into Iraqi territory, to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and to replace him in Baghdad with a Shi'ite regime, the consequences for the Persian Gulf would be immense. The first countries to suffer from these consequences would be Kuwait and Bahrain, where there are substantial Iranian or Shi'ite minorities, and Saudi Arabia, whose large Shi'ite community in the eastern part of the country also could not escape the kind of involvement which would result therefrom. Although this is not very probable, this scenario remains possible and would be likely, if it becomes a reality, to involve Western military intervention, at the request of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

A second and more plausible possibility is that the belligerents will find themselves practically in the situation where they were before September, 1980, and which would be characterized by a precarious peace studded with sporadic conflict. That would be the result, not so much of a real diminution of hostilities but of a kind of status quo which neither of the two countries would be in a position to turn into a real peace treaty. The motive for a resumption of hostilities would then continue to exist, depending only on the capabilities or on the occasions. This state of intense and prolonged tension would make Iran-Iraqi rivalry into the center of political gravity of the Persian Gulf and of the whole Middle East. It would also be the central pivot around which the foreign policy of the Gulf states would turn over the foreseeable future.

It cannot be said that the Iran-Iraq war, a consequence of the Iranian revolution, and Tehran's revisionism are a serious threat for the Arab states of the Middle East. If this threat exists, however, it is not posed in military terms or in terms of territorial acquisitions, but rather in the sense of placing in question the legitimacy of the regimes which govern these countries and the way in which their peoples are ruled. Whether through its promotion of a policy for the masses based on a revolutionary form or populism which ignores frontiers in the appeals to the community or whether through its implacable hostility to new ideas (and therefore hostility to the West), contemporary Iran is throwing down a serious challenge to its neighbors in the Persian Gulf. If its clerical regime consolidates its position, this challenge can only grow stronger. Thus, it is as much the future of Iran as the war itself which constitutes a source of profound concern for the states of the Persian Gulf.

In short the war has been full of surprises and may still hold other surprises in reserve. The inability of most analysts to foresee the outbreak of the war, its development, and its consequences is understandable, taking into account the numerous paradoxes which we have just emphasized. On the basis of all the evidence this war cannot serve as a model for future conflicts in the Third World. However, it shows how much such conflicts can differ from each other. It may very well be that historians and students of politics are in a better position to understand it than specialists in strategic studies.

PLANS OUTLINED FOR RESTORING ELECTRICITY OF WAR AREAS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Aug 82 p 6

[Interview with Engineer Pir, managing director of electricity for western area]

[Text] Bakhtaran--KEYHAN correspondent--"The areas struck by the war and sabotaged by the Ba'thist mercenaries will be connected to the nationwide electrical network by two programs, a short-term and long-term one."

So said Engineer Pir, managing director of electricity for the western region, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN's correspondent in Bakhtaran. He spoke about the duties of the electricity office on the War Zones Reconstruction Staff, the office's level of activity in the area and in Bakhtaran city, and the office's long-term program. He announced that the western electricity office had presented a comprehensive program to the ministry of power to reconstruct the electricity network in the cities of Qasr-e Shirin, Musian, Sar-e Pol-e Zahab, Dehloran, Mehran and Gilan-e Gharb even before the Ba'thist mercenaries had left Iran's Islamic homeland and the ruined cities of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been freed from the claws of the Ba'thist executioners. He also announced that a 60 million tuman [?] budget had been allocated for this work during the March 1981-March 1982 year.

He stated: Preparations to purchase equipment and parts were immediately made, such that last year about 40 million rials of the budget above was spent. After the withdrawal from the war zones, and as soon as the War Zones Reconstruction Staff was organized in Bakhtaran Province, the electricity office for the western region began its work on the staff by presenting its previous plan and coordinating itself completely with other bureaus, organs and revolutionary institutions.

Concerning the scale of electrical damage inflicted on the war-struck zones, and the budget amount allocated to this area, he said: According to estimates made by experts, the damage inflicted on electrical facilities in all the war-struck areas is about 170 million tumans. During the current year 400 million rials have been allotted to this work.

Concerning the level of work already completed, and duties entrusted to the office by the War Zones Reconstruction Staff, the managing director of

electricity for the western region stated: Our jurisdiction includes Ilam and Bakhtaran Provinces, incorporating the ruined cities of Sar-e Pol-e Zahab, Gilan-e Gharb, Dehloran, Sumar, Naft-e Shahr, Mehran and Khosravi.

He added: During the first stage the cities of Sar-e Pol-e Zahab and Gilan-e Gharb are supposed to be readied for receiving refugees, and then Dehloran is to be readied. I should announce that the work of electrifying Gilan-e Gharb has been completed.

Concerning this, he added: The work of electrifying Sar-e Pol-e Zahab has begun, and will be ready in another month. Work began three months ago in Dehloran, and 60 percent of it has been finished.

Then, concerning other points that had been under the occupation of the Ba'thist mercenaries, Engineer Pir said: Some of the cities like Naft-e Shahr, Sumar, Mehran, Musian and Qasr-e Shirin were leveled to the ground by the Iraqis. It is not clear whether the reconstruction staff will decide to reconstruct then in their previous locations or in another place. In our view this work will take about two years.

The managing director for electricity in the western region also said: The Ba'thists completely destroyed a great many electrical facilities and centers. Therefore complete changes must be made in this respect. Our long-term program is to connect these cities to the nationwide network so their connections with the local network will be cut. In this way the war-stricken Muslim nation can use better-quality electricity.

As the interview with KEYHAN continued, the managing director said: As for the activities of the electricity office in the Bakhtaran area, I must say that from last year to the present a new 63-kilovolt station got underway, and the second line between Kangavar and Bakhtaran was connected.

The managing director of the region's electricity added: At the same time we have a very comprehensive program whose contracts have been concluded. This program includes two parts, a 63-kilovolt station and 63-kilovolt lines. They will cost about 6 billion rials. We hope to finish this program within the next two years so that the city of Bakhtaran will get the best possible quality of electrical delivery.

He added: The whole region will be covered by a powerful electrification system during the next two years, and Ilam and Kordestan will also be connected to the nationwide network. The budget designated for this work is more than all the investment prior to the revolution.

Concerning village electrification, and the level of activity in this regard, he said: Over the years from March 1978 to March 1982, the number of villages using electricity went from 116 to 347, [as written] and in the region from 285 villages to 1,028. In the three-month period from March to June 1982, about 61 villages have been added to the region's villages, and 25 villages added to Bakhtaran Province.

In conclusion, concerning the speed of repairs to the damage arising from Iraqi bombardments, Engineer Pir said: Due to non-centralization, the gathering of resources in the city-regions, and the endeavors of the electricity office's committed personnel, electricity was restored in 12 hours to all the provinces maintained by us which had been ruined by the enemy's warplanes. In Bakhtaran, electricity was restored in four hours to four spots in the city which had been bombed and had lost their electricity.

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IRAQI POW BATTALION COMMANDER PRAISES IRANIAN PLANNING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Aug p 4

[Text] Ahvaz--KEYHAN correspondent--An operational battalion commander of Iraq's 50th Armored Brigade who had been captured by Islam's warriors last Thursday morning took part in an interview with KEYHAN's Ahvaz correspondent dispatched to the southern warfronts. He identified himself as Captain Louis Mohammad Saleh-Jam'i, 25th Tank Battalion, 50th Armored Brigade, 12th Iraqi Division. He was captured at 0130 hours last Thursday by warriors of the Islamic Republic of Iran after an Iranian attack. He said: More than 80 percent of our brigade was annihilated in Iran's blitzkreig attack. The majority of the brigade's personnel was killed, wounded or captured by the forces of Islam. The captured Iraqi officer then stated his view concerning Islam's warriors' entry into Iraqi soil, and said: The Iranian army's entry into Iraqi soil during the Ramadan operations is in my view entry into its own soil, because both the territories of Iraq and Iran are Islamic. I see no reason that there should be an obstacle to Iran's entry into Iraqi soil.

He then pointed to the situation of the Ba'thist army, and the morale of the Iraqi soldiers, and said: After the Bait ol-Moqaddas operations which led to the liberation of Khorramshahr, we returned to our own borders, and deployed on our own soil. We imagined that our personnel's morale had changed, that it would be at a high level, and that it would differ from what it had been when we were on Iranian soil. On the contrary however, when the Ramadan operations began, we observed weak morale in the same degree as before. It could be seen in a very noticeable way during various stages of that operation.

Captain Louis Mohammad Saleh then pointed to the political and economic conditions in Iraq, and added: Iraq's economic condition was good at the beginning of the war, but as the war dragged on, Iraq's political and economic state and position gradually became shaky and began to decline. The captured Iraqi officer told our correspondent: Not only now that Islam's forces are in control of our cities and villages, but throughout the course of the war I have never seen nor have I heard from any one that Iranian artillery or air force warplanes had struck our populated, civilian areas. They have not done this anywhere in Iraq, not in Khaneqin, not in Basrah.

He then pointed to the Ramadan operations, and said: During the five stages of the Ramadan operations, we confronted consecutive attacks by Islam's warriors

that took place with good planning. Iranian infantry and artillery performed an important, excellent role in inflicting heavy, pulverizing blows against our forces and positions. Captain Mohammad Saleh pointed to Iranian conduct after his capture, and added: I had not imagined before that the Iranian brothers would have such humane conduct towards us. This is because lying propaganda in the Iraqi army, which is now obvious to us, made us understand that if we were captured the Iranians would adopt inhumane and very bad conduct towards us. They also made propaganda about another issue in the same area. From the time of my capture until now I have observed nothing but good, humane conduct on the part of the Iranian brothers. Concerning the advanced T-72 tanks, the captured Iraqi officer, who had been on the fronts during almost two years of war, said:

It is very evident to me that during these operations, a number of the Iraqi army's T-72 tanks were destroyed, and some others in good shape were taken as booty by Islam's warriors. Our correspondent then asked his view on the Ba'th Party, and the captured Iraqi officer responded:

The Iraqi Ba'th Party does not have an ideology such that the Iraqi people have any belief or faith in it, or that the party has any value for them. Instead it is an idea they have invented which they persuade for people to accept by means of force. If a person does not affiliate with this party, he will be deprived of having a good life in Iraq. He then pointed to demonstrations by Iraq's people against the ruling regime, and said: I myself have witnessed marches and demonstrations by Iraqi people against the Ba'th Party and the ruling regime in several cities. They have already had effects on the Ba'th Party and the regime.

KEYHAN's correspondent asked the captured Iraqi officer for his view concerning the fact that Iraq's propaganda machine announces that Iraq's domestic economic situation is good, and that there has been absolutely no problem or economic pressure throughout the war which could lead to an interruption of food supplies to the Iraqi people. The officer said: I myself have observed a great many shortages in Iraqi cities. Particularly during the past few months they have intensified, and I have seen long lines for gasoline, fuel oil, and some food items. If Iraqi radio and television programs announce that such a thing does not exist in Iraq, it is a pure lie.

Concerning RADIO IRAN's Arabic-language broadcasts, Captain Mohammad Saleh, a youth of 28 years and a graduate from the Iraqi Army Officer University, said: RADIO IRAN's Arabic programs come in very clearly, and it has a great many supporters in Iraq. Most of the people who are interested in this program cannot listen to it freely, but they do it in secret. These programs have already had a good, positive effect on the Iraqi people. The Iraqi Ba'thist regime is dealing with this problem harshly.

In conclusion he was asked about the conduct of Iraq's Ba'thist army towards Iranian prisoners. He responded: I have not seen from up close the conduct of Iraqis towards Iranian prisoners, and have only seen it on television. Apparently their conduct towards Iranian prisoners was good.

CHIEF REPORTS ON STATUS OF IDEOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Aug 82 p 18

[Report by Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi, chief of the Political-Ideology Office, Ministry of Defense]

[Text] Mashhad--KEYHAN correspondent--Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi, director of the ministry of defense's political-ideology section, took part in a seminar of the heads of stores throughout the country which are part of the Reliance Organization, a ministry of defense affiliated body. Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi participated in the seminar, held in holy Mashhad, in the ideological area. He spoke and provided planning, coordination and guidance. He gave an interview to KEYHAN's reporter.

Sending peace and praise to the Islamic revolution's great leader, His Eminence imam Khomeyni, and praising Islam's martyrs and the martyr-nourishing nation of Iran, he spoke about the goal in organizing such a seminar, and said: The first goal in organizing the seminar is for officials to feel their responsibility vis-a-vis the blood of the martyrs, the people's movement, and the devotion and sacrifice of the warriors on all the fronts. The feeling must be developed in officials that they must strive to serve our dear people and our combatants more than they have in the past so that work proceeds in a concerned way pleasing to God.

The second purpose in holding the seminar was the awareness that their work, culture and religious affairs should progress side by side with these issues. To express it differently, expertise, science, work and effort must be put at the service of religion, and ultimately bring about the triumph of Islam over blasphemy and world arrogance.

Concerning the circumstances of the seminar of Reliance Organization store heads, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi stated: The reason for the seminar was so these people could raise their problems and their problems could be solved and solutions presented by other people and officials.

Concerning the activity of the Political-Ideology Directorate in the ministry of defense, this organ's success, and its joint use of ideology and expertise, he said: The Political-Ideological Section in the ministry of defense has had a lot of success. After all, one must be aware that educational and

propaganda work must be accomplished by using special sensitivity. This is because this issue is involved with the people's sentiments. Of course we might not be able to get quick results from cultural work. However, we have accomplished a great deal for the revolution so far by this method. Now the personnel of the ministry of defense and subordinate organizations are believing, Party of God people who allocate several days out of their month's salary to the front. Naturally, these actions are indebted to the propaganda, educational and cultural work of the Political-Ideology Section which have intensified the spiritual dimension in these people. We are not talking only about helping through wages, but about the great work accomplished by the dear workers, employees and soldiers in various sections of the ministry of defense to increase production and to serve better and more valuably. All of this too is indebted to the faith created in them. Today if we say that the expertise, work and effort of people are put at the service of religion, this is the truth.

It was asked: Did or does the Political-Ideological Section have a role in the purification or expulsion of persons from the ministry of defense?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi responded: In general the Political-Ideology Section has had and has nothing whatsoever to do with the purifications and expulsions. Basically these matters are outside the purview of the Political-Ideology Section. The section has a prophetic role, meaning that of propaganda, guidance and drawing those in the armed forces towards true Islam. Therefore purification, reform or expulsion of individuals are not duties of the Political-Ideology Office. Of course individuals with grudges wanted to implicate the Political-Ideology Office in these actions in order to decrease the confidence in and popularity of this organization. Fortunately, due to the awareness of ministry of defense personnel, these plots and schemes were neutralized and came to nothing. Today the personnel interpret the Political-Ideology Section of the ministry of defense as an authority, a refuge and a means to peace.

Concerning means of using personnel from outside the ministry of defense to instruct ministry of defense employees, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahimi said: We have used both groups, from without and within the ministry of defense. Of course we have still not been able to arrange short and long-term courses so that we can use them in future classes as instructors and assistants. Therefore, professors from outside were mainly used. The goal of our future program is to instruct ministry of defense personnel, and to use the best of them as instructor assistants to teach others.

Concerning problems of the Political-Ideology Section, and proposals and solutions to eliminate defects, he said: We have the same problems as other institutions. This is the nature of the revolution, and the passage of time will solve these problems. Therefore we will attack the problems with vigor, and we will remove all these problems from our path with the cooperation of the committed, believing personnel of the ministry of defense. He added:

We believe a time will come when we will not have problems. Basically life is struggle and effort to eliminate problems. If a problem is removed, other

other problems will take its place. This is the nature of life. The philosophy of life, according to the instructions of the leader of the free ones, beloved Hosseyn, is struggle and battle to eliminate problems. Fundamentally the world and problems occur together. As we travel this road, there are a great many ups and downs. There are obstacles as we pass along it, and problems in every direction we look.

Thus as His Eminence 'Ali stated: The world is a house clothed in hardships and entanglements. Therefore, as long as we are in the world, we will face problems. God willing, we should remove the obstacles one by one with patience and forbearance.

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YOUTH ORGANIZATION LEADER CITES MILITARY TRAINING, ACTIVITIES

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 20 Jul 82 p 7

[Interview with Mr 'Abd al-Majid 'Arbu, head of the State Federation of Iraqi Youth, by AL-THAWRAH: "Numerous Initiatives to Support Our Just Battle; Weapons Training for 15,000 Youths" date and place not specified]

[Text] The State Federation of Iraqi Youth, Ninevah branch, continues its effective activities in support of our just battle. At one time or another, it holds people's markets, which so far have numbered some 20 of these markets. Our young people have also donated some 55,000 dinars, as a first payment for the war effort. In the field of arts, all their activities have been dedicated to the battle, with the basic heritage of songs, operas, drama, and posters and pictures expressing the victories and heroics of the glorious Qadisiyah Saddam troops.

AL-THAWRAH confirmed that in an interview with Mr 'Abd al-Majid 'Arbu, head of the State Federation of Iraqi Youth in Ninevah, who went on to say:

"The Ninevah branch of the State Federation of Iraqi Youth has significantly participated in the glorious Qadisiyah Saddam battle. Since the beginning of the war, it has formed committees to mobilize the efforts of youth groups to serve the war effort, including the following:

"The Civilian Defense Committee: The federation took on the responsibility for civil defense volunteers' affairs in the province from the very first days of war. Volunteers have participated in some special missions. A special team was formed for rapid movement to save wounded during enemy raids on residential areas.

"In the area of training, 15,000 youths from youth groups were trained on weapons in 1981 alone. Military training continues on a broad scale during the summer holidays for the youth groups and in mobilization leadership camps.

"Large numbers of youths have been sent to factories and social organizations in support of production, and our youth groups are still doing this work every day during the summer holidays. Numerous courses in first aid and injections have been given, and a great many youth groups have been sent on numerous occasions to give blood.

"Concerning media activities, the war information committee has been issuing a bi-monthly pamphlet concerning the war. It has been able to cover all the cultural and educational results of the youth groups, pertaining to the live interaction with our just struggle. It has also held forums, folk celebrations and lectures."

The head of the federation continued:

"The plan of the State Federation for Iraqi Youth has begun to get closer to mobilizing all the masses' efforts in support of our sacred battle against the Iranian foe, and to participate more effectively in mobilizing the masses."

With regard to the federation's future plans, he said:

"During this stage, the federations' future plans will concentrate specifically on building the new generation, which will be in harmony with and distinguished by the noble Qadisiyah Saddam, with the heroics of our army and people and their self-sacrifice in love for the leader and the nation and the people. Our branch has opened courses in cooperation with the State Organization for Youth Training, to teach the youth driving, typing, correspondence and first aid, in order to participate effectively in the new Arab Qadisiyah.

"Courses have also been started to teach ceramics, sewing and wood-working.

"Several youth training camps have also been opened, as well as popular markets, which have expressed the youth's drive to give their efforts and material goods in support of the just battle. In addition, there is the plan designed to support production, in coordination with the factories and plants, in order to support them through the manual labor of the youths.

"It must be said that all the various and numerous activities and energies are dedicated to serve the triumphant Qadisiyah Saddam battle, with ever escalating, higher efforts in this regard.

"A pledge from our youth that they will always be loyal to and faithful soldiers of the inspirational leader, President Saddam Husayn, and of the 17 pan-Arab revolution and our glorious Arab Nation."

7005

CSO: 4404/603

MEA CONCERNED OVER ISRAELI COMPETITION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 285, 7 Aug 82 p 47

[Text] On 26 July the Israeli Airline EL-AL opened an office in Sidon in southern Lebanon with Henry Izakovich as its director. On the first day of operation, Izakovich declared "business is booming." The (news) agencies reported that 250 persons stood in line to get tickets from the offices located in the Israeli military headquarters.

This step caps the Israeli activity aimed at normalizing economic relations with Lebanon and stimulating Lebanese travel through Lydda Airport. It was preceded by a number of preliminary steps in this direction, e.g., the attempt to use the Middle East Airline (MEA) office in Sidon, facilitation of the operation of building a land route to Israel, and use of the Ansar Airport for military purposes in preparation for its use for civilian purposes.

The fact is the opening of the EL-AL office in Sidon is about to translate the fears and anxieties of MEA into an obvious reality and give concrete form to the great challenge facing Lebanon and MEA in civil aviation, specifically, the continued closure of Beirut Airport is causing MEA to lose 1,500,000 liras a day and threatens its very life if the situation doesn't stabilize in 2 months at most.

In view of the Israeli attempt at normalizing civil aviation, MEA took a two-fold action last week which, if successful, will counter, at least in part, the Israeli plan to shrink the role of Beirut Airport over the middle term.

MEA management began negotiations with the Cypriot authorities to permit it to route a number of trips from Larnaca Airport to some European capitals in addition to two trips to Africa. It is hoped with the publication of this issue of AL-MUSTAQBAL that the negotiations will have succeeded. Up to last week, the negotiations had reached the point of approval of the trips in principle, with the expectation of reaching an agreement on some financial details, the most important being the share of the Cyprus Airlines in MEA revenues.

At the beginning of the negotiations Cyprus Airlines requested a commission of 25 percent of the profits. In exchange, MEA Management took a similar step vis-a-vis Damascus in an attempt to give the company the temporary right to route trips from Damascus to certain agreed upon capitals.

How important and justified now are MEA plans under the particular circumstances through which Lebanon and the company are passing? The step is very important, as is clear from the following considerations:

- (1) After Beirut Airport was shut down, a large number of Lebanese who have to leave the country travel either through Larnaca Airport or Damascus Airport--to the former by sea through the Gulf of Juniya and to the latter by land through Tripoli-Homs-Damascus. The fact is most Lebanese travel over one of the routes while the minority up to now has used Lydda Airport. The difficulties include the length of time (the trip takes), the increased costs, and customs barriers. If these difficulties persist, they will induce some to take the easier route and not the more difficult.
- (2) MEA's scheduling its trips through Damascus and Larnaca provides national compensation for the difficulties of reaching these two airports. It likewise serves as a national alternative and incentive to frustrate Israeli schemes to accustom the Lebanese to enter their land and travel on EL-AL planes.
- (3) Lebanese travel through the two airports may provide sufficient compensation for MEA to make up some of the material losses it has suffered.
- (4) Employing the MEA fleet in this way yields psychological and propaganda returns not only for the company but for the country as a whole in view of the special position that the company occupies in the Lebanese economy.
- (5) Creation of this breathing space for MEA, although partial, may be its salvation, especially on the social level because 5,000 employees are threatened with the loss of jobs if the crisis continues or with a pay cut of as much as 50 percent at best. If this should happen, it would be the beginning of similar measures adopted by the rest of the Lebanese establishments less able than MEA to bear the burdens of the current crisis.
- (6) Besides the above considerations, this action taken by MEA is a practical test of the extent to which the Syrian and Cypriot authorities will fulfill the company's request, the former on the basis of the special fraternal relations that link it to Lebanon and the latter on the basis of good-neighbor relations and return of a small part of the profit Cyprus has reaped from the events in Lebanon in trade, industry, tourist, and use of its airport and harbor. Will it now be the friend in the time of need?

In addition to the action of MEA which it is hoped will succeed, a continuation of the crisis in Beirut and a continuation of the blockade of the city on four sides may produce a serious demand that the Beirut International Airport be neutralized and opened to all parties. But anyone familiar with the complexities of the Lebanese crisis is aware of how impossible such a request appears to be. Those who follow the situation believe it is necessary to raise the proposal at international gatherings. Others are of the opinion that this request may become feasible after the end of the Beirut crisis and there is no need after the Lebanese crisis ends or indeed the Middle East crisis. They believe this action is necessary to unmask Israel's sinister intentions toward Lebanon and its economy and towards its airport.

INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AMAR

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 12, 16 Aug 82

[Interview with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, by a CHAAB correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] The prices of the last harvest season, regarded as incentives, will be maintained this year. This is at least what Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, announced in an exclusive interview with CHAAB. The minister also revealed that the various regions have received 44 million Mauritanian ouguiyas for agricultural projects and that a surveillance and action system for dealing with locust attacks is being arranged. All these measures, he said, have been taken with a view to ensuring the success of the present agricultural production season. In the course of this interview, of which we publish the first part today, the minister also mentioned the livestock situation, the fight against rabies, and the decision to establish veterinary pharmacies.

[Question] The first rains have begun to fall in several parts of the country, indicating the beginning of the winter season which we hope will be good. How does the situation in the country look now? Was the drought this year as bad as it was in previous years?

[Answer] It is appropriate to emphasize first of all that the rains which fell in Mauritania during the months of June and July, 1982, were generally below the 30-year average (1941 to 1970), except for Nema, where the average for the two months was slightly above normal. Up to now, therefore, the rainfall this year is less than expected. However, we hope that the rain in August and September will be better.

However, it is already certain that the planting of rain-fed crops will be delayed and therefore productivity will be only mediocre because of the warm winds which can be anticipated and which are bad for the crops at the end of their growing cycle.

Livestock has suffered considerably during the very long dry season. The nutritive value of pasture fodder was only mediocre. Mineral shortages in

Centers of infection	70
Ouad Naga	65

4) The destruction of wild carnivores by chemical poisoning. The figures are as follows:

Poisoned bait around centers of infection	76
Poisoned bait around Nouakchott	105
Poisoned bait set out between Ouad Naga and Nouakchott and around Ouad Naga	115

5) Vaccination or serotherapy for humans who have been in contact with infected animals or animal products.

6) Lifting of the quarantine 60 days after the last observed death from the disease, as provided for by the laws in force.

Fortunately, no human case of rabies has been reported.

The people of Saboucire, which is located in an area without natural pastures, were provided with considerable help in the form of food and animal fodder by the Commissariat for Food Assistance.

[Question] Some cattle raisers complain about the lack of medicines. To deal with this problem, don't you think it will be necessary to open veterinary pharmacies in certain regions of the country?

[Answer] This question is important. It is a problem right now. The availability of biological and pharmaceutical products at any time is one of our permanent concerns.

The budgetary allocation annually provided to the Directorate of Animal Husbandry is enough to deal with the vaccinations required for the two principal diseases: bovine pestilence and contagious bovine pneumonia. We can also provide a quantity of medicine for all sectors and subsectors of the animal husbandry industry.

Let us also recall that Mauritania today is the only African country which distributes veterinary medicines and specialties free of charge, but we absolutely cannot give each cattle raiser everything he wants in terms of veterinary products, unless more than half of the national budget should be earmarked for animal husbandry. You will understand that this is not possible. Hence, the sale of certain biological products (vaccines and medicines) is considered necessary.

In this connection it has been arranged that under the FAC [French Aid and Cooperation Fund] project (at Gorgol) and the EDF [European Development Fund] project (in the two Hodhs regions and Guidimaka), which will begin operation in the near future, these biological products will be sold to ordinary citizens at advantageous prices.

Furthermore, my ministry is presently studying the best way to arrange for the establishment of veterinary pharmacies in order to deal with, as you say, this shortage of medical products, which has been accentuated by an unprecedented development of cattle raising in the urban area near the capital.

[Question] In a few weeks the new farming season will begin. What measures has your ministry taken to ensure a successful season this year--assuming that there is sufficient rainfall?

[Answer] The preparations for the 1982/1983 farming season are based this year on the same themes as last year, though perhaps without the campaign to sensitize and mobilize our farmers and our cattle raisers by sending missions of senior officials from Nouakchott. This campaign to sensitize the farmers should be assumed by the regional authorities.

Actions under consideration concern a guarantee of remunerative prices for production. In this regard the prices during the past farming season, which were considered sufficiently encouraging, will be maintained. It's the same thing with the collection and sale of agricultural surpluses. The Hodhs and Trarza regions have been allocated credits to order equipment and material for sedentary cultivation. Many communities have received equipment for the production of flowers.

Vegetable seeds will also be provided to the regions. Each agricultural zone has a stock of insecticides for the fight against insects that destroy crops. A surveillance and action system against locust invasions has been established.

The regions have received 44 million Mauritanian ouguiya for agricultural projects, and each agricultural region will have a brigade of rural engineers assigned to it.

Thus, these are the timely measures taken to supplement the major projects which have already been undertaken.

[16 Aug 82 p 3]

[Question] There are many land disputes here and there which at times threaten to lead to open fighting. What are the implications of such a situation for the agricultural growing season?

[Answer] In fact there are some cases of conflict based on problems involving agricultural land which have been noted. However, they have never had such gravity as some people of ill will have attributed to them. The policy of economic progress and social justice followed by the national leadership can

only be carried out properly in an atmosphere of order and discipline. If order and discipline are violated, the national leadership will re-establish them, by force if necessary. No one should have any doubt about that.

I say that because your question seems to suggest that the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and the government are just responding to events. That's not the case at all.

Having said that, I would admit that there are classic disputes between communities regarding agricultural land. These disputes will find their solutions in the land reform presently under study. Meanwhile, the communities involved in disputes have been asked to reach amicable temporary arrangements, under the auspices of the administrative authorities, so that fertile land will not lie fallow, since our country has a large shortage of grain. It has been carefully emphasized that this formula completely preserves the rights of the parties involved, while awaiting a later, definitive solution.

[Question] Quite recently, disputes of this kind have broken out in Tamchakett, in Hodh, and in Brakna. What measures have been taken to resolve them?

[Answer] We have regrettably had some disputes in certain regions. However, they have not had the serious character which has been attributed to them. To tell the truth, these disputes are heartbreaking, because communities which at times are manipulated by elements unknown to them believe naively that by such regrettable behavior they will lend greater weight to their case or that they will thereby be able to exert pressure on the government.

Such views are false. The government will not depart from the line of conduct which it has traced for itself and which consists of a search for an overall and just solution, leaving aside passions and pressures.

[Question] Up to now the role of the government has been limited to acting like a fireman, not taking part until a dispute breaks out. Isn't it time to arrange for a definitive solution and resolve the land problem once and for all?

[Answer] Your question once again suggests a certain government position which is far from the truth. The government does not limit itself to putting out the fire when it breaks out, as a fireman does.

This kind of passive role is far from that of the national leadership regarding the land problem. The land problem in part is a consequence of the policy of favoring the rural people, adopted by the CMSN which, in this way, has attached greater importance to the land. On the other hand the measures taken by the national leadership in favor of the previously exploited classes of society have also contributed to increasing the demand for land and to worsening inter-community tensions regarding this problem.

We knew that we were going to overturn established habits and sharpen appetites, which at times were unreasonable. That is exactly what happened.

It is nonsense to believe that the regime deliberately created the conditions for a profound change in our society and that it is content to put out the fires that flare up. Instead of taking hasty action at the risk of committing errors that would have been prejudicial to its program of reform, the national leadership chose, and correctly so, to undertake a detailed study of the land problem and to seek an equitable solution for everyone, inspired by our religion and which will ensure the final and overall success of the effort. It is very easy to criticize. It is just as easy to develop theories which are attractive on paper (but which are impractical in reality), particularly when you don't have to assume responsibility for failure.

Some people say: "Give the land to those who cultivate it." Others say: "It's only justice to dispossess the 'exploiters.'" This kind of reasoning comes down to substituting one injustice for another, although to different social groups. Now, what we are looking for is justice for everyone and equality among everyone, while recognizing that absolute equality does not exist and that no society is perfect.

I ask you to tell me of one society where everything is going well in all areas. You have to choose the solution which reconciles the interests involved as much as possible.

Contrary to what people think, the difficulty lies much more in the transfer of community property to individual property within the same group than in the transfer of this same property between two separate groups.

The solution of the land problem clearly deserves detailed study because of its complexity and its implications. The national leadership has fully understood the problem in this way and will not act hastily or under pressure, as I have said.

[Question] Have you any comment to make on the occasion of the beginning of the growing season?

[Answer] I would just say to my fellow citizens who are farmers and cattle raisers that they have a very important role to play in making up our country's food deficit. They should perform this role with competence and in a serious way.

The CMSN, by giving them priority attention and by translating this priority into action, has created for them a heavy obligation to the national community. I ask them to take care of this responsibility in a loyal fashion.

5170
CSO: 4519/282

PARTICIPATION IN GULF COMPANY FOR ARAB INVESTMENT

Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 12 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by 'Atif Mustafa: "Qatar's Share in Gulf Company for Arab Investment Almost Covered in a Few Days"]

[Text] Yusuf al-Darwish, a member of the Qatari committee for the Gulf Company for Arab Investments which will be established in the free zone in the Arab Republic of Egypt with a capital of \$500 million, stated that there is high interest on the part of Qatari investors, particularly in participating in Qatar's share which amounts to \$20 million. Meetings were held in Cairo from 12 to 14 June attended by about 71 Gulf investors representing the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and during the meetings members of the delegation of Gulf investors got together with people in Egypt in charge of finance and economy, particularly the Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah, and were also received by the Egyptian prime minister.

During the meetings all important issues were raised, particularly those problems encountered by Gulf investors such as red tape which prevents the easy completion of projects. Senior officials, led by the prime minister, promised that all the problems would be overcome and resolved in order to get projects moving and to realize interests in common among the Gulf investors and the Egyptian government as well as Egyptian investors.

In his statement to AL-RAYAH Yusuf al-Darwish went on to say that almost all of Qatar's share would be covered within the next few days.

Ahmad al-Da'ij, the well-known Kuwaiti investor who is responsible for monitoring the establishment of the company, went to Cairo a few days ago to get the license for establishing the company in Egypt. During this visit, he was able to meet with several senior officials and he will make public the results of his contacts when he returns to Kuwait.

The company is expected to begin operation the end of this year. The permanent committee of Gulf investors will hold a meeting in Kuwait in the last half of the month of Shawwal after the end of the 'I al-Fitr holidays to discuss everything concerning the future of the company and results since the first meeting in Cairo attended by Gulf investors. At the Kuwait meeting there will also be a review of everything done during that period. The results of that meeting will be made public in due course.

Yusuf al-Darwish affirmed that the Qatari side would play its role in conformity with the decisions of all the investors and founders of the company in the GCC countries, particularly since that step will give strong proof of the solidarity of investors in the council countries and their involvement in joint projects bringing general benefits. They will also have the opportunity for coordination in various economic fields and for the exchange of expertise in this field that will give them the chance to invest in fields producing ample returns.

Yusuf al-Darwish ended his statement by saying that during the meetings of the permanent Qatari committee that represents Qatari investors, we sensed a strong desire and readiness to participate with their brothers, the Gulf investors, in such investment projects contrary to reports that Qatari investors had no wish to get involved in such projects and these investments. Participation in this company will be a fine start for Qatari investment and their involvement in a number of projects in the future, God willing.

8389

CSO: 4404/595

PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR KORDOFAN GOVERNMENT

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 28 Jul 82 p 7

[Text] The government of the Kordofan Region has begun its course and standing at the threshold of a new, historic phase for the local government in its first meeting on Monday morning, 5 July, with the full participation of the various branches of the leadership of national action. The meeting was designed to hear the program of action of the government for the next phase, read to the meeting by al-Fatih Muhammad Bashir Bisharah, governor of the region. He began by talking about what the situation required in the way of preparation. He expressed thanks to God for what had been achieved during the past period and prayers to Him for success in future steps.

Then there was a brief talk about the important outlines of the road that had previously been taken.

The success that was achieved during the life of the transitional government was attributable firstly, secondly and thirdly to the unity, cohesiveness and solidarity of the agencies and institutions, actions within them, using the approach of openness, and dialogue, practicing consultation and democracy and reaching collective decisions by conviction and persuasion.

He then said: "We today are entering a new phase, a phase of bolstering and focusing regional government, releasing energies and mobilizing material and human resources to move forward in this region to vast horizons of development more necessary than at any time in the past, and to more solidarity and harmony and action as a team so as to attain our goals."

He discussed the indicators governing the movement of national action for the historic phase which regional government in Sudan had entered, presenting them in the following terms: "The populace of Kordofan which has supported and backed us and has given us its precious trust and has impelled us forward to select one of us to lead the region expects a lot, a great deal of us."

He then posed the question: "What are we doing?"

He then responded, addressing the meeting, saying: "Naturally we do not have Moses' staff or Alladin's lamp or Solomon's seal to change life or do the impossible between dusk and dawn." He then went on to say: "However, we do have the will, ability, determination, faith and self-confidence."

Duties of the Next Phase

The governor summed up the duties for action in the new phase in the life of the regional government in the following points:

Mobilizing capabilities, rising to the level of responsibilities commensurate with hopes and desires.

Application to work and production and exerting maximum efforts to help the people of Kordofan and provide a free, honorable life for them, to employ all capabilities and potential to achieve their aspirations, to elevate their lives and to work to provide water to relieve the burden of thirst.

Knowledge for the ignorant, clothing for the naked, medicine for the ill and food for the hungry.

Paving roads, establishing farms, building factories and providing means of stability for those lacking it.

Stimulating the system of ministerial supervision by constant field activity, meeting with the people on their own ground and getting to know their concerns and issues and working to resolve them close at hand.

Checking on the agencies and staff with a view toward raising their skills, doubling their production and removing obstacles from their paths so that they can set about performing their jobs and duties effectively and competently. Releasing and mobilizing the capabilities of the masses to bring about an economic, social and political renaissance in this region by handing over authority fully to the masses for them to exercise it through the local peoples government institutions as embodied in the councils of the areas and the local peoples councils.

Devising new financial resources and improving and modernizing methods of revenue collection and imposing controls over the smuggling of produce in order to increase autonomous revenues so as to make it possible to provide better services to the people and attain self-sufficiency in the near future.

Commitment to Implementation of the Program

The governor of the region submitted his program for the next phase to the meeting, stressing the need for total commitment to the realistic election program he had submitted to the masses since that was a pledge and a pact which we have made and it must be adhered to in letter and in spirit. He went on to say that our adherence and commitment must be accompanied by a commitment to follow up on things and to implement the points contained in the speech delivered by the president, our leader, at the beginning of this month on the occasion of the decentralization holiday and regional government day, a speech that is to be considered as a guide.

Before the governor ended his talk to the conferees, he recommended to them: "Extending counsel and deference to right among us is acceptable and necessary.

I therefore always ask each of you for your advice and request that you support me in what is right and hold me back from error.

"Good faith and sound conviction is fine but bad faith is not.

"Differences of opinion are fine but changing views for friendship is not. Constructive criticism and alternate views are fine but unfounded criticism and uncommitted thinking are not.

"Tolerance, justice and equality among people in every region, both north and south, are fine but discrimination among people is not."

He ended his talk by saying: "Let our loyalty be to the populace of Kordofan who have given you their trust. Let our promise to them be that we will not waver or slack off one single moment in serving their interests and lifting burdens from them."

8389

CSO: 4504/447

COUNTRY'S ROLE IN LEBANON CRITICIZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 243, 19 Jul 82 p 19

[Article by Haytham Ibrahim: "Has the Syrian Role in Lebanon Been Completed?"]

[Text] Political observers do not disagree about the fact that Syria is playing a certain role in Lebanon. The regime in Damascus thinks that Lebanon's security and Syria's security are one and the same. It was under this premise that Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976. It was under this cover that Syria formed an alliance with the Phalangist party against the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement, preventing both organizations from deploying their forces and establishing their control over the country. In fact, Syrian forces used military force to stop the Resistance whose victories and powers were at their peak. The forces of Hafiz al-Asad's regime did not hesitate about shelling Palestinian camps in Jisr al-Basha, al-Jiyah, al-miyah wa miyah and Tall al-Za'tar. Nevertheless, official Arab statements attest to the fact that the forces of al-Asad's regime are present in Lebanon under the cover of the Arab deterrent forces. Ever since that year the Zionist enemy has launched more than one attack on south Lebanon and carried out more than one aggressive air operation against guerrilla positions and Palestinian camps. In all cases Syrian troops adhered to the orders that had been issued to them to take no action and not to cross the red line that had been set for them. At that time political and media circles talked about the formula of an agreement that was made between the Syrian regime and the United States of America. Kissinger, who shuttled back and forth in the area at that time announced that Syrian and Israeli troops would not cross the red line that was set for them in south Lebanon.

Thus, as the Syrian regime understands it, the security of Lebanon is literally construed as Lebanon's internal security, not its national security. Syria interpreted that as protecting Lebanon from any danger or foreign threat. That was until the Zionist invasion of Lebanon which began last 5 June. Zionist invasion forces are still controlling Lebanon, pounding cities and villages with their artillery. The invasion created the worst massacre in the history of the Arab-Zionist struggle. Tens of thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese were killed, and villages and cities were destroyed in their entirety. Nevertheless, the Syrian regime took no action to ensure that Lebanon's national security would be defended. However, Syrian forces did occasionally stand in the way of Israeli forces that approached their own positions, especially in the area of al-Biqa' and on the Beirut-Damascus Road.

Every now and then the Syrian regime would try to sign cease-fire agreements. [Syria kept up those efforts] until conditions came to what they are now.

After Israeli forces were positioned in Lebanon, Kissinger revealed new secrets about the relationship between the Syrian regime and the Zionist entity. He also revealed the role both of them played in Lebanon. The former architect of U.S. foreign policy announced that both Syria and Israel had gone into Lebanon to prevent the emergence of a PLO political entity or military presence on their borders. In 1976 Syria sent its army to Lebanon to prevent a PLO victory. The lip service Syria renders to the establishment of a Palestinian state does not go as far as allowing such a state to emerge on its borders. This is because Syria fears being surrounded by radical forces. After 6 years Syria and Israel came to the same conclusion: the PLO forces which had been forced into south Lebanon following the Syrian advance in 1976 had become intolerable.

This is what Kissinger wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST of 17 June 1982. In that article Kissinger reveals the U.S. plan in the Middle East and the secrets of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Consequently, Syria was recently accused by Arabs, Palestinians and Lebanese. Syria is being accused not only because it was derelict in fulfilling its commitments, withdrawing its forces from the real confrontation areas, then agreeing to a cease-fire with Israel after pretending to put up a fight for no more than 2 days, and leaving the Resistance and the National Movement to fight alone; but Syria is also being accused of taking part in the conspiracy.

The Syrian regime's group, 'Asim Qansuwah and the members of Asad's leadership organization in Lebanon, left Beirut when the Israeli invasion began. Without telling any of their allies in the Lebanese National Movement, they went to Ba'labakk and from there to Damascus.

At all locations where they confronted the Zionist invasion forces in the south, in Mount Lebanon and in western al-Biqa', Syrian units withdrew without actually putting up a fight.

The invasion forces now control half the territory of Lebanon; they also control the Beirut-Damascus Road from a Beirut suburb to Sawfar. With their fire power, invasion forces have control over the rest of the area from Sawfar to the Lebanese-Syrian borders.

The condition of the Syrian units that are left in some national areas is poor militarily, and their morale is low. Observers in Beirut noticed that the units that were placed in the battle were troops whose loyalty to the Syrian regime was held in doubt, such as the armored brigade 70, a large part of which was destroyed. This brigade had fought after some hesitation in issuing orders; it fought without air cover and without surface anti-aircraft artillery even though it is known that the SAM missiles were nearby.

Sources of the National Movement in Lebanon affirmed that the regime of Hafiz al-Asad had recalled to Damascus from al-Biqa' two special forces brigades. In their place the regime sent two reserve brigades to al-Biqa'. The regime also recalled the active Syrian forces from Beirut and kept two battalions there consisting of only 400 persons. It is being said that most of the people in these two battalions are from the area of Jabal al-Druze and Huran.

Because of these measures that were taken by Hafiz al-Asad's regime regarding Syrian forces in Lebanon, losses were considerable and disproportionate with their participation in the battles. Reports by some Syrian pilots who were shot down over Phalangist party areas exposed the collusion of the Syrian regime with the Zionist entity. One of these pilots said that their orders were to fly only over their bases. No weapons were furnished to them, and while they were flying over their own bases, they received orders to go to Lebanon. When they entered al-Biqa' area, they were surprised by Israel's air force. Therefore, some of their airplanes were shot down by enemy fire, and some pilots parachuted from their airplanes without engaging the enemy. Thus, the total number of Syrian airplanes that were shot down over Lebanon was 85.

Hafiz al-Asad's regime was not satisfied with all this; it joined the invading Israeli forces in slaughtering the Lebanese people. The forces of Hafiz al-Asad's regime engineered direct clashes with the people of Tripoli in north Lebanon, and this city was showered with heavy artillery.

Trustworthy sources in Beirut indicated that it was Hafiz al-Asad personally who issued the orders to the special forces to shell Tripoli. These sources stated that the mufti of Lebanon, Hasan Khalid, sent a delegation to Hafiz al-Asad that was headed by Dr Salim al-Huss, former prime minister of Lebanon. The delegation asked al-Asad to order the Syrian troops in Tripoli to stop their operations against the people in Tripoli. Hafiz al-Asad's response to the delegation was this: "We will not allow a number of 'scoundrels' to infringe upon the dignity of the Syrian authorities in Lebanon, no matter what the pretext. I've instructed the armed forces to send to Tripoli the same units that put down the opposition in Hamah. Tripoli is not more valuable to us than Hamah. I advised those units to use the same method they used in Hamah and not to exercise leniency there."

Before the recent clashes in Tripoli and after Israeli forces entered Lebanon, Syrian authorities recalled the forces they had sent to Tripoli. These were the same forces that had taken part in the events in Hamah. The forces were recalled to Damascus, and the red cavalry forces were sent to Tripoli in their place. These forces entered Tripoli via Dayr al-Ahmar-the Cedars Road. The incidents in Tripoli began 2 days after the arrival of these forces there.

It was all these actions and positions of Hafiz al-Asad's regime that made the people of Lebanon reveal the truth about the conspiracy Hafiz al-Asad was carrying out against them with the cooperation of the Zionist entity. But they are still suffering from the pangs of death, and they have not had an opportunity to call the hand of the conspirators who have been trading in the question of Lebanon for a long time.

8592
CSO: 4404/605

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

OIL FIELD SECURITY MEASURES--The executive council has decided to declare all petroleum fields and installations to be prohibited areas. No one will be allowed in or near them without a permit issued in advance by the Abu Dhabi general police directorate. It was announced in a report by the council's general directorate that it decided in this connection that anyone violating that [the permit requirement] would be prosecuted according to the provisions of Article I of the penal code of 1980. [Text] [Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 11 Aug 82 p 2]

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